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INTRODUCTION
“What’s in a name!” laments Juliet at her Shakespearean balcony.1
Four hundred years later, in the world of e-commerce, Juliet’s
question would be “What’s in a domain name?”  After spending all of
the Montague’s wealth, Romeo might be able to respond, “Call me
but love.com.”  The price tag for some generic domain names cost a
small fortune: Sex.com for $250 million,2 Business.com for $7.5
million,3 Broadband.com for $6 million,4 Loans.com for $3 million,
Flu.com for $1.4 million,5 and Bingo.com for $1.1 million.6
In 1995, Procter and Gamble registered hundreds of generic
domain names and offered them for sale at auction web sites five
years later.7  The high price tags on generic domain names in the
                                                          
1. WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, ROMEO AND JULIET, act 2, sc. 1, lns. 80-90 (William
Shakespeare The Complete Works, Barnes & Noble, Inc. 1994).
Juliet:
‘Tis but thy name that is my enemy;
Thou art thyself though, not a Montague.
What’s Montague? it is nor hand, nor foot,
Nor arm, nor face, not any other part
Belonging to a man.  O, be some other name!
What’s is a name! that which we call a rose
By any other name would smell as sweet;
So Romeo would, were he not Romeo call’d,
Retain that dear perfection which he owes
Without that title: - Romeo, doff thy name;
And for that name, which is no part of thee,
Take all myself.
Romeo.
I take thee at thy word:
Call me but love, and I’ll be new baptized;
Henceforth I never will be Romeo.
2. See Jon Swartz, Sex.com Ownership Ruling Expected Domain Name Hotly Disputed,
USA TODAY, Aug. 2, 2000, at 3B.
3. See Greg Johnson, The Costly Game for Net Names: In the Dot-com World,
Recognition is Everything, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 10, 2000, at A1 (reporting eCompanies, a
Santa Monica-based e-commerce incubator firm, bought the domain name
business.com for $7.5 million).
4. See Mark Ribbing, Local Firm Seeks Profit in Sale of Dot-com Name; By One
Valuation, It Could Bring From $5,000 to $5 million, BALT. SUN, Mar. 23, 2000, at 1C
(“The name ‘broadband.com’ is on sale for $6 million, while ‘in.com’ could be yours
for $10 million.”).
5. See Cynthia Flash, Are They Cybersquatters or Cyberentrepreneurs?, CMP TECHWIRE,
July 20, 2000 (reporting that “loans.com” was sold to Bank of America;
“beautiful.com” is on sale at $3 million and flu.com for $1.4 million).
6. See Nick Wingfield, The Game of the Name:  Thinking Up the Perfect Address is
Crucial; Just Hope Nobody Else Owns It, WALL ST. J., Nov. 11, 1999, at R14 (reporting
bingo.com sold for $1.1 million, drugs.com for $823,456, and university.com for
$530,000).
7. See Patrick Larkin, Profit.com: P & G Sells ‘Net names, CIN. POST, Aug. 30, 2000,
at 6B (reporting Procter and Gamble are selling almost 100 generic Internet domain
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world of electronic commerce (“e-commerce”) represents a challenge
to established trademark law.  Internet companies spend large sums
of money to acquire generic domain names and then expect certain
legal protections for their investment.  They look to trademark and
unfair competition law to protect their domain names.8 Large
monetary investment and high speculation in generic domain names
bring into question whether trademark and unfair competition law
can protect generic domain names.  This conflict gives rise to several
issues. First, whether trademark and unfair competition law under
the Lanham Act9 should be extended to protect generic domain
names that are highly valued in e-commerce. Second, whether
extending the established trademark law to generic domain names
will destroy the basic fabrics of trademark jurisprudence. Third,
whether the extension hinders the growth of e-commerce to grant
trademark exclusivity to generic domain name. Finally, whether it
contradicts the existing domain name system that provides
registrations on a first come first serve basis where registration of
almost identical domain names, such as computer.com and
computers.com, are allowed to co-exist peacefully.
Part I of the Article will focus on the trademark paradigm before
the arrival of e-commerce.  The historical roots of trademarks and
development of modern trademark law will be discussed to provide
                                                          
names through the auction site greatdomains.com); see also Flash, supra note 5
(reporting Proctor and Gamble are among large corporations selling generic
domain names that they had registered).
Auction web sites are selling generic domain names for commissions in the
secondary domain name market. See Flash, supra note 5 (stating there are at least
twenty-seven companies selling domain names); Sabra Chartrand, Auctioning second-
hand domains gives rise to another internet, DESERET NEWS, Aug. 26, 2000 (reporting web
domain names are now being sold in the secondary market).  Bank of America
bought “loans.com” for $3 million from a California businessman who had no
operating web site but received 3,000 to 4,000 hits a day. See Larkin, supra note 7;
BofA Was Winning Bidder of Loans.com Web Domain, WALL ST. J., Feb. 8, 2000, at B15.
There is an on-going bitter litigation over the ownership of the domain name
“sex.com” spanning the last two years.  See Martin Kady II, Sex.com fight rages, BUS. J.,
Aug. 18, 2000, at 3; see also Cohen v. Carreon, 94 F. Supp. 2d 1112, 1120 (D. Or.
2000) (staying of action pending resolution of California case, Kremen v. Cohen,
involving the ownership of the domain name “sex.com”).
8. The Thomson-Thomson Monitor reported that there were 1,700 trademark
application filings trademarks beginning with the prefix “e” in 1999, a 220% increase
from the 530 such applications in 1998.  The Thomson-Thomson Monitor also reported
that in 1999, 12,150 domain names ending in “.com” were filed as trademarks or a
636% increase from 1,650 in 1998.  Further, there are 110,000 domain names that
begin with “e”.  See Thomson & Thomson, Thomson-Thomson Monitor (Oct. 23, 2000),
available at http://www.thomson-thomson.com; see also BigStar Entm’t, Inc. v. Next
Big Star, Inc., 105 F. Supp. 2d 185, 218 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) (declining to extend
trademark protection to BigStar.com because the mark is descriptive and has not
acquired a secondary meaning).
9. 15 U.S.C. § 1051 (1994).
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an understanding of trademarks and their functions in commerce.
Part II will address how e-commerce fosters the creation of online
branding with generic domain names.  The demand for generic
domain names in e-commerce is at a feverish stage and online
companies are willing to pay high price tags for domain names solely
for the purpose of getting Net surfers, i.e., potential customers, to
their sites. Part III will examine the functions of domain names and
whether such functions could be qualified as a trademark function.
Finally, Part III will also examine whether a domain name that is
capable of functioning as a trademark, but is not a valid trademark,
can be protected under unfair competition law.
I. THE TRADEMARK PARADIGM BEFORE E-COMMERCE
Trademark protection is “the law’s recognition of the psychological
function of symbols.”10  Justice Felix Frankfurter observed that we live
by symbols and thus spend significant money on goods and services
bearing symbols.11  The power of a symbol dates back to the ancient
times when humans used symbols to mark their goods for ensuring
the identification of ownership.12  The idea of using a mark or symbol
to identify the source of the goods remains a passion of competing
companies.13  In recent years, however, that idea has evolved into a
                                                          
10. Mishawaka Rubber & Woolen Mfg. Co. v. S.S. Kresge Co., 316 U.S. 203, 205
(1942).
11. See id.
12. For a general explanation of the historic origins of trademarks, see, e.g.,
FRANK L. SCHECTER, THE HISTORICAL FOUNDATIONS OF THE LAW RELATING TO
TRADEMARKS (1925) (discussing the legal implications of trademarks from the Middle
Ages to the 1920s); Sidney A. Diamond, The Historical Development of Trademarks, 65
TRADEMARK REP. 265 (1975) [hereinafter Diamond] (tracing the development of
trademarks from roots in Antiquity); Abraham S. Greenberg, The Ancient Lineage of
Trademarks, 33 J. PAT. OFF. SOC’Y 876 (1951) (discussing trademark usage from the
Book of Genesis through the age of the Guild System); Beverly W. Pattishall, Two
Hundred Years of American Trademark Law, 68 TRADEMARK REP. 121 (1978) (providing a
bicentennial overview of trademark usage and development in the United States
from 1772 to 1977); Gerald Ruston, On the Origin of Trademarks, 45 TRADEMARK REP.
127 (1955); Trademark Timeline, 82 TRADEMARK REP. 1022-40 (1992) (providing a
timeline of trademark usage from the ancient to the present time).
Animal branding is an ancient form of marking to identify cattle with certain
owners and such branding practice was depicted in wall paintings in Egypt and cave
paintings in southwestern Europe, dating back to the Stone Age. See Diamond, supra
note 12, at 266-67.  As far back as 4000 B.C., quarry marks and stonecutters’ signs
were common in Egyptian structures for purposes of proving stone cutter’s claim to
wages. See WILLIAM H. BROWNE, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF TRADEMARKS AND
ANALOGOUS SUBJECTS 1-14 (1885) (tracing the history of trademarks).  Artisans in
ancient China used marks of designs, colors and names on pottery to indicate the
destination or the place of manufacture. See Greenberg, supra note 12, at 878.
13. Companies spend millions of dollars annually to advertise their trademarks.
Through various means, from hand flyers, billboards, newspapers, trade journals,
and television to electronic banner advertisements, companies use trademarks as
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quest of transforming a mark into a “brand” that enjoys all the rights
of trademark protection.14
Trademark protection has evolved over the years.  Both common
law and federal trademark statutes exist side by side to protect marks
from unfair competition,15 infringement,16 dilution,17 and
cybersquatting dilution.18  Prior to the enactment of the first federal
trademark statute, early common law trademark cases provided
protection to the senior user of a trademark, prohibiting subsequent
                                                          
shorthand for the source of various products.  See John Kimelman, Free Tony the Tiger,
FIN. WORLD, Sept. 1, 1993, at 50 (“the value of brands [are] created in large part as a
direct result of the companies’ advertising campaigns over the years”).  See also
McCarthy on Trademarks & Unfair Competition, § 1.20 (4th ed. 1997) (“Competing
sellers fight among themselves for the dollars of the consumer.  To get the dollars,
sellers of goods and services may spend substantial amounts in advertising the trade
symbol of their product, which we label a “trademark.”).  Companies understand that
the greater recognition a mark has among the public and the more it is identified
with a product or products, the more valuable the trademark will become.  See Maria
Mallory, Pop Goes the Pepsi Generation: A Struggling Pepsi-Cola Offers a Cautionary Tale in
Brand Stewardship, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., June 16, 1997, at 48-9. In other words,
the stronger the identification of the mark with the product, the stronger the “brand
equity” the trademark enjoys.  The brand equity of a trademark is measured by
translating consumer loyalty and recognition of the trademark into estimated
financial value.  For example, the Coca-Cola trademark is valued at $24 billion, while
the Nike trademark has an estimated value of $7.3 billion.  See Industry Calls for
Stiffer Enforcement of Anti-counterfitting Laws Abroad, 44 Pat., Trademark &
Copyright J. (BNA) 585, 586 (Oct. 1, 1992); Mallory, supra, at 49.
14. See Mishawaka Rubber, 316 U.S. at 205 (recognizing the merchandising power
of trademarks); Rochelle C. Dreyfuss, Expressive Genericity:  Trademarks as Language in
the Pepsi Generation, 65 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 397 (1990) (discussing how trademarks
have invaded the popular culture); Alex Kozinski, Essay, Trademarks Unplugged, 68
N.Y.U. L. REV. 960, 961-63 (1993) (analyzing how the role of trademarks has changed
from identifying the source to identifying the product itself).
15. See Lanham Act § 43(a), 15 U.S.C. § 1125(A) (1994).  Unfair competition,
palming off, deceptive trade and business practices are state claims commonly
asserted along with the federal Lanham Act claims.  See Genesee Brewing Co. v. Stroh
Brewing Co., 124 F.3d 137, 149 (2d Cir. 1997) (common law unfair competition
claims closely resemble Lanham Act claims except the state claim may require an
additional element of bad faith or intent); WSM, Inc. v. Hilton, 724 F.2d 1320, 1331
n.6 (8th Cir. 1984) (indicating that Missouri common law of unfair competition is in
accord with the Lanham Act). See generally J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, 1 MCCARTHY ON
TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION, (West) § 1:16, 1:32-34 (4th ed. 1997)
(discussing state and federal unfair competition and highlighting Supreme Court
decisions retreating from “federal only” unfair competition position); J. Thomas
McCarthy, Important Trends in Trademark and Unfair Competition Law During the Decade
of the 1970s, 71 TRADEMARK REP. 93 (1981); U.S. TRADEMARK ASSOC., STATE TRADEMARK
AND UNFAIR COMPETITION LAW (1989) (Clark Boardman Callaghan).
16. See Lanham Act § 32, 15 U.S.C. § 1114(1) (1994 & Supp. 2001) (imposing
liability for infringement of registered trademarks).
17. See Lanham Act § 43(c), 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c) (1994) (imposing liability for
dilutive use of famous trademarks).  There are twenty-eight states with anti-dilution
statutes.  See Courtland L. Reichman, State and Federal Trademark Dilution, 17
FRANCHISE L.J. 111, 132 (1998) (discussing state dilution laws).
18. See Lanham Act § 43(d), 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d) (1994) (imposing liability for
unauthorized domain registrations of trademarks with bad faith intent to profit from
the goodwill of the trademarks).
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use of the same trademark by junior users on the same types of
goods.19  Unlike patents and copyrights,20 trademark rights are not
expressly stated in the Constitution.21  Congress enacted the first
federal trademark statute in 187022 under the patent and copyrights
clause of the Constitution,23 but the Supreme Court struck it down in
1879.24  Two years after the Supreme Court’s decision, Congress
exercised its power under the Commerce Clause25 to extend
protection to trademarks.26  Trademark rights protect all valid
trademarks without proof of novelty or originality.27  Before the
arrival of e-commerce, trademark common law and the federal
trademark statutes shaped the landscape of trademark protection.
Trademark law seeks to accomplish two goals.  First, trademark law
strives to protect consumers who form a particular association with a
trademark.28  Second, trademark law attempts to preserve the rights
                                                          
19. See, e.g., Sykes v. Sykes, 107 Eng. Rep. 834 (1824) (affirming the jury verdict
in favor of the plaintiff in a case where the defendants marked their inferior goods
with the same “Sykes Patents” mark used by the plaintiff “for the express purpose of
being resold, as goods of the plaintiff manufacture”).
20. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 (“The Congress shall have Power To . . .
promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to
Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and
Discoveries”).
21. See, e.g., Trade-Mark Cases, 100 U.S. 82, 94 (1879).
The trade-mark recognized by the common law is generally the growth of a
considerable period of use, rather than a sudden invention.  It is often the
result of accident rather than design, and when under the act of Congress it
is sought to establish it by registration, neither originality, invention,
discovery, science, nor art is in any way essential to the right conferred by
that act. . . . [W]e are unable to see any such [Congressional] power in the
constitutional provision concerning authors and inventors, and their writings
and discoveries.
Id.
22. See id. at 92 (citing the relevant Act at “chap. 2, tit. 60, Sects. 4937 to 4947 of
the Revised Statutes . . . as being ‘An Act to revise, consolidate, and amend statutes
relating to patents and copyrights,’ 16 Stat. 198”).
23. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
24. See Trade-Mark Cases, 100 U.S. at 96 (holding the federal trademark statute as
beyond the power of Congress to enact under the patent and copyright clause of the
Constitution and, therefore, finding the statute unconstitutional).
25. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
26. In 1881, Congress enacted the federal trademark protection statute under
the Commerce Clause.  See Act of Mar. 3, 1881, ch. 138, 21 Stat. 502-04 (1881). In
1905, the statute was modified significantly.  See Act of Feb. 20, 1905, ch. 592, 33 Stat.
724-31 (1905).  The statute went through further changes in 1920.  The present
federal trademark protection statute is the 1946 Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. 1051 et seq.
See Act of July 5, 1946, ch. 540, 60 Stat. 427-46 (1946), codified at 15 U.S.C. § 1051 et
seq.  The Trademark Counterfeiting Act of 1984, 18 U.S.C. § 2320, criminalizes
trafficking in goods or services bearing counterfeit trademarks.  The Trademark Law
Revision Act of 1988 permits a bona fide intent to use trademark registration, in
addition to the option of registering a mark previously used in commerce.
27. Trade-Mark Cases, 100 U.S. at 94 (“The ordinary trademark has no necessary
relation to invention or discovery.”).
28. See Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Prods. Co., 514 U.S. 159, 163-64 (1995)
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of the trademark owner who substantially invested in their
trademarks.29  These two goals balance each other.  The source-
identifying role of trademarks is to benefit both the consuming
public and trademark owners.30
Trademarks broadly include any word, phrase, name, symbol, logo,
device, or image that is used or intended to be used by a person in
commerce.31  Not all trademarks are entitled to protection.32 The
more distinctive a trademark, the more protection it is entitled.33
Like most other aspects of law, the rule sounds easier in the abstract
than in practice.34
                                                          
(explaining that trademark law aims to reduce the consumer’s risk of purchasing the
wrong product).
29. See id. at 164 (stating that trademark law aims to assure producers that they
will be able to “reap the financial, reputation-related rewards” of their product).
30. See, e.g., Walt-W. Enters., Inc. v. Gannett Co., 695 F.2d 1050, 1057 (7th Cir.
1982) (stressing the importance of remembering that “the wrong involved is
diverting trade from the first user by misleading customers who meant to deal with
him”). The court warns that producers may gain “unwarranted competitive
advantage” if property rights in a name are assumed without considering the extent
of consumer misunderstanding. See id. (citing James Burrough, Ltd. v. Sign of the
Beefeater, Inc., 540 F.2d 266, 274 (7th Cir. 1976) (“A trademark is not that which is
infringed.  What is infringed is the right of the public to be free of confusion and the
synonymous right of a trademark owner to control his product’s reputation.”)); Int’l
Order of Job’s Daughters v. Lindeburg & Co., 633 F.2d 912, 919 (9th Cir. 1980)
(“The property right or protection accorded a trademark owner can only be
understood in the context of trademark law and its purposes.  A trademark owner
has a property right only insofar as is necessary to prevent consumer confusion as to
who produced the goods and to facilitate differentiation of the trademark owner’s
goods.”) (citing J. MCCARTHY, TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION § 2:6-2:7
(1973)).  See generally Mark A. Lemley, The Modern Lanham Act and the Death of Common
Sense, 108 YALE L.J. 1687, 1714-15 (1999) (explaining the fundamental shift in
trademark law to value trademarks as property themselves and suggesting courts
eradicate the property-based rationale by protecting trademarks against likelihood of
confusing use and true dilution); Glynn S. Lunney, Jr., Trademark Monopolies, 48
EMORY L.J. 367, 370 (1999) (recognizing trademark protection can both advance and
disserve the development of an efficient and competitive market).
31. See 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (1994) (defining trademarks).
32. See Horizon Fin., F.A. v. Horizon Bankcorp., 2 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1696, 1701
(E.D. Pa. 1987) (“Not all names or designations may receive protection.”); Nabisco,
Inc. v. PF Brands, Inc., 191 F.3d 208, 215 (2d Cir. 1999) (explaining that “no one can
claim the exclusive right to use” a mark like “CAR” which has little or any
“distinctiveness”). The court explains that a mark with little or no distinctiveness can
be protected only if the “consuming public has come to associate [it] with the
products or services of its user,” which is the concept of secondary meaning. See id.
33. See Nabisco, Inc., 191 F.3d at 215-16 (“Distinctiveness is a crucial trademark
concept, which places marks on a ladder reflecting their inherent strength or
weakness.  The degree of distinctiveness of a mark governs in part the breadth of the
protection it can command. . . . The strongest protection of the trademark laws is
reserved for these most highly distinctive mark.”); Mobil Oil Corp. v. Pegasus
Petroleum Corp., 818 F.2d 254, 258 (2d Cir. 1987) (holding the “unparalleled
strength” of plaintiff Mobil’s Pegasus trademark deserves “broad protection against
infringer”).
34. See Abercrombie & Fitch Co. v. Hunting World, Inc., 537 F.2d 4, 9 (2d Cir.
1976) (stating that the difficulties of demarcation “are compounded because a term
that is in one category for a particular product may be in quite a different one for
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Common law attempted to measure trademarks and accord them
with appropriate protection.35 Not until 1976 and Judge Henry
Friendly’s decision in Abercrombie & Fitch Co. v. Hunting World, Inc.,36
however, did a trademark scale based on distinctiveness become the
authoritative instrument to measure trademarks.37  The Abercrombie &
Fitch distinctive spectrum dictates that a trademark will be accorded
as inherently distinctive if it is “arbitrary,” “fanciful,” or “suggestive” in
relation to the goods bearing the trademark.38
Arbitrary and fanciful trademarks receive automatic trademark
protection because they serve solely to identify the particular source
of a product.39  Indeed, arbitrary and fanciful trademarks bear no
relationship with the goods the marks represent.40 Arbitrary
trademarks can be common words, but they are used in very
uncommon ways.41 Examples of such marks include HORIZON
(banking services);42 APPLE (for computers);43 AMAZON (for on-line
retailing bookstore).44  Fanciful trademarks are non-dictionary
                                                          
another, because a term may shift from one category to another in light of
differences in usage through time, because a term may have one meaning to one
group of users and a different one to others, and because the same term may be put
to different uses with respect to a single product.”).  See also Thompson Med. Co. v.
Pfizer Inc., 753 F.2d 208, 213 n.8, 215 (2d Cir. 1985) (finding the lines between
classes of trademarks are “chimerical” and “illusory”).
35. See Trade-Mark Cases, 100 U.S. 82, 92 (1879) (“The right to adopt and use a
symbol or a device to distinguish the goods or property made or sold by the person
whose mark it is, to the exclusion of use by all other persons, has long been
recognized by the common law.”).
36. 537 F.2d 4 (2d Cir. 1976).
37. See Abercrombie & Fitch, 537 F.2d at 9-11 (organizing the “principles of
trademark law” into four eligibility groups in order of increasing protection); see also
Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Samara Bros., Inc., 529 U.S. 205, 211 (2000) (referring to the
Abercrombie distinctiveness test as the “now-classic test originally formulated by Judge
Friendly”).
38. 537 F.2d at 11 (contrasting suggestive, arbitrary, and fanciful with
“descriptive” marks which “conveys an immediate idea of the ingredients, qualities in
characteristics of the goods”); Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 529 U.S. at 211 (explaining that
inherently distinctive marks primarily refer to the source of the product).
39. See Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 529 U.S. at 210 (reaffirming the general rule that
arbitrary, fanciful and suggestive marks are inherently distinctive); Abercrombie &
Fitch, 537 F.2d at 11 (explaining that as with suggestive terms, arbitrary or fanciful
terms do not require further justification for protection).
40. See Sara Lee Corp. v. Kay Ser-Roth Corp., 81 F.3d 455, 464 (4th Cir. 1996)
(explaining that both arbitrary and fanciful words “neither suggest any mental image
of the associated product nor describe it in any way”).
41. See id. (explaining that certain trademarks are labeled as arbitrary because
the word or words seem “arbitrarily assigned” to the good they designate even
though such words do “denot[e] ‘real’ things”).
42. See Horizon Fin., F.A. v. Horizon Bankcorp., 2 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1696, 1702
(E.D. Pa. 1987) (concluding that the HORIZON trademark is arbitrary for banking
services).
43. See Sara Lee Corp., 81 F.3d at 464 (noting “Apple” is an arbitrary trademark for
computers).
44. Amazon is the name of a river in South America and a mythical tribe of
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words.45 Examples of such marks include EXXON (gasoline),
CLOROX (detergent),46 and KODAK (for film goods).47  Trademark
law provides arbitrary and fanciful trademarks the highest level of
trademark protection because these highly unique and inherently
distinctive trademarks have a greater chance of the public mistaking a
similar or related junior mark from the original mark.48
Suggestive trademarks require consumers to draw a conclusion or
guess the connection between the trademarks and the goods.49
Suggestive trademarks reflect “creativity; abstract thought and
intuition; allegorical reference; metaphorical resemblance; figurative
imagery . . . and sheer incongruity.”50 For example, PENGUIN
(refrigerators)51 CITIBANK (banking services)52 GOLIATH (for
pencils)53 ROACH MOTEL (insect trap)54 are all suggestive
trademarks.
                                                          
women warriors.  There is no relationship between “Amazon” and the goods and
services provided under the mark (online book sales).  See Wingfield, supra note 6, at
R14 (reporting that “Amazon” is a highly “elastic” brand name that provides much
flexibility for expansion of goods and services under the same brand name).
45. See Sara Lee Corp., 81 F.3d at 464 (describing fanciful marks as “made-up
words”).
46. See id. (noting “Exxon” and “Clorox” are fanciful trademarks).
47. See Eastman Kodak Co. v. Rakow, 739 F. Supp. 116, 118 (W.D.N.Y. 1989)
(characterizing the Kodak trademark as one of the strongest and most distinctive
trademarks in the world).
48. See Mobil Oil Corp. v. Pegasus Petroleum Corp., 818 F.2d 254, 258 (2d Cir.
1987) (explaining that the unparalleled strength of Mobil’s mark makes it more
likely to be confused with similar marks and thus deserving of broad protection
against infringers) (citing James Burrough Ltd. v. Sign of the Beefeater, Inc., 540
F.2d 266, 276 (7th Cir. 1976) (“A mark that is strong because of its fame or its
uniqueness, is more likely to be remembered and more likely to be associated in the
public mind with a greater breadth of products or services than is a mark that is
weak. . . .”)).
49. See Stix Prods., Inc. v. United Merchants & Mfgs., Inc., 295 F. Supp. 479, 488
(S.D.N.Y. 1968) (determining that the trademark “CON-TACT” is suggestive because
“more than mere observations is required to reach the conclusion that a product so
branded is self-adhesive decorative covering, that it may be applied to a surface with
ease upon fingertip pressure, and that when so applied it adheres to the surface”).
50. BigStar Entm’t Inc. v. Next Big Star, Inc., 105 F. Supp. 2d 185, 196-97
(S.D.N.Y. 2000) (emphasizing the role of “creativity” both in devising suggestive
marks and perceiving how they are linked to their products).
51. See Union Nat’l Bank of Texas, Laredo, TX v. Union Nat’l Bank of Texas,
Austin, TX, 909 F.2d 839, 845 (5th Cir. 1990) (“An oft-cited example of suggestive
term is ‘Penguin’ as applied to refrigerators.”).
52. See Pita Delight, Inc. v. Salami, 24 F. Supp. 2d 795, 800 (E.D. Mich. 1998)
(calling “Citibank” a suggestive mark because it “connotes an urban or modern
bank”).
53. See id. at 800 (noting that “Goliath” connotes a large size and thus it is a
suggestive trademark for pencils).
54. See Am. Home Prods. Corp. v. Johnson Chem. Co., 589 F.2d 103, 106 (2d Cir.
1978) (holding that ROACH MOTEL is “at least” suggestive—if not arbitrary—
because even though some motels have roaches, “motels are surely not built for
roaches to live in”).
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A descriptive trademark is not inherently distinctive because it
describes the quality or characteristic of the goods or services upon
which it is affixed.55  A descriptive trademark is protected only if it has
acquired distinctiveness or secondary meaning through marketing,
sales, usage, and passage of time that consumers have come to
associate the descriptive trademark with a particular source or
origin.56  COCA-COLA is an example of a descriptive trademark that
has acquired a secondary meaning.57  Similarly, to be eligible for
federal trademark registration, the descriptive trademark must have
acquired secondary meaning.58  Registration of a merely descriptive
trademark that has obtained “incontestable” status after five years of
continuous use from the registration date will not be subject to
cancellation.59  Examples of descriptive trademarks include AFTER
TAN (post-tanning lotion), KING SIZE (men’s clothing) and
YELLOW PAGES (telephone directory).60
A generic trademark refers “to the genus of which the particular
product is a species.”61 Examples of generic marks include
CONVENIENCE STORE (retail stores), DRY ICE (solid carbon
dioxide) and LIGHT BEER (ale-type beverage).62  Most courts favor
an absolute rule that generic trademarks are not entitled to
protection.63  The rationale for this rule is that trademark protection
                                                          
55. See Zatarain’s, Inc. v. Oak Grove Smokehouse, Inc., 698 F.2d 786, 790 (5th
Cir. 1983) (explaining that descriptive terms by themselves “ordinarily are not
protectable as trademarks”); Pita Delight Inc., 24 F. Supp. 2d at 800 (“A descriptive
term specifically describes a characteristic or ingredient of the article.”).
56. See Zatarain’s, Inc., 698 F.2d at 795-96 (affirming the district court’s finding
that “Fish-Fri” merits trademark protection because the term carries a secondary
meaning in the New Orleans area).
57. See Sara Lee Corp. v. Kay Ser-Roth Corp., 81 F.3d 455, 464 (4th Cir. 1996)
(“‘Coca-Cola’ is probably the paradigm of a descriptive mark that has acquired a
secondary meaning.”).
58. See 15 U.S.C. § 1052(f) (1994) (permitting registration of descriptive
trademarks only upon proof of acquired distinctiveness).
59. See Park ‘N Fly, Inc. v. Dollar Park & Fly, Inc., 469 U.S. 189, 205 (1985)
(holding that the trademark registrant “may rely on incontestability [of the
trademark] to enjoin infringement and that such action may not be defended on the
grounds that the mark is merely descriptiveness”).
60. See Sara Lee Corp., 81 F.3d at 464 (noting that After Tan, 5 Minute glue, King
Size men’s clothing, and Yellow Pages for telephone directory are all descriptive
marks).
61. Abercrombie & Fitch Co. v. Hunting World, Inc., 537 F.2d 4, 9 (2d Cir.
1976).
62. See Sara Lee Corp., 81 F.3d at 464 (providing several examples of generic
marks).
63. See Abercrombie & Fitch, 537 F.2d at 9 (explaining the “doctrine of impossibility
of achieving trademark protection for a generic term”); Miller Brewing Co. v. G.
Heileman Brewing Co., 561 F.2d 75, 79 (7th Cir. 1977) (finding that a generic
trademark can never become a protectable trademark); Nat’l Fed’n of the Blind, Inc.
v. Loompanics Enter., Inc., 936 F. Supp. 1232, 1246 (D. Md. 1996) (“A generic term
is never protectable as a trademark”); TCPIP Holding Co., Inc. v. Haar
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of generic marks would have an anti-competitive effect.64  Exclusive
use by the owner of a generic term would hamper fair competition
since competitors would be barred from using the name of the article
that they seek to market.65
To summarize, while arbitrary, fanciful, and suggestive trademarks
receive automatic protection because of their inherent
distinctiveness, descriptive marks are only protected upon proof of
acquired distinctiveness.66  Generic marks, in contrast, are never
protected.67  Currently, traditional trademark jurisprudence is being
challenged by a new kind of mark claimed by e-commerce businesses:
domain names.
                                                          
Communications, Inc., 244 F.3d 88, 93 (2d Cir. 2001) (“Generic marks, consisting of
words that identify the type or species of goods or services to which they apply, are
totally lacking in distinctive quality; they are not entitled to any protection against
infringement, even if they have become famous as marks, because according such
protection would deprive competitors of the right to refer to their goods by name.”);
see also Sunrise Jewelry Mfg. v. Fred, S.A., 175 F.3d 1322, 1323 (Fed. Cir. 1999)
(noting that registration for a jewelry design product configuration may be cancelled
notwithstanding “incontestable” status); Kendall-Jackson Winery v. E. & J. Gallo
Winery, 150 F.3d 1042, 1053 (9th Cir. 1998) (holding that the autumnal grape-leaf
designs featured on wine bottles is generic in the wine industry).
64. See Abercrombie & Fitch, 537 F.2d at 10 (discussing anti-competitive effects of
protecting generic trademarks).
65. See, e.g., Genesee Brewing Co. v. Stroh Brewing Co., 124 F.3d 137, 147 (2d
Cir. 1997) (stating that a mark is generic when applied to goods or services that
require the use of the mark in order to convey their nature to the consuming
public); Abercrombie & Fitch, 537 F.2d at 9 (noting that “the user of a generic term”
cannot deprive competing manufacturers of the product of the right to call an article
by its name”); A.J. Canfield Co. v. Honickman, 808 F.2d 291, 305 (3d Cir. 1986)
(“[I]f a term is necessary to describe a product characteristic that a competitor has a
right to copy, a producer may not effectively preempt competition by claiming that
term as its own.”); CES Pub. Corp. v. St. Regis Publications, Inc., 531 F.2d 11, 13 (2d
Cir. 1975) (“To allow trademark protection for generic terms, i.e., names which
describe the genus of goods being sold, even when these have become identified
with a first user, would grant the owner of the mark a monopoly, since a competitor
could not describe his goods as what they are.”); Holzapfel’s Compositions Co. v.
Rahtjen’s Am. Composition Co., 183 U.S. 1, 9 (1901) (finding no protection for “the
only name by which it was possible to describe” the product). See generally Ralph H.
Folsom & Larry L. Teply, Trademarked Generic Words, 89 YALE L.J. 1323, 1328-29 (1980)
(“[W]hen no name other than the trademarked word is available to the public or
competitors to indicate the type or class of product on which the trademark is used,
exclusive control of the trademarked word has not been permitted.”).
66. The Lanham Act generally denies protection of descriptive marks, subject to
the following exception in § 2 (c) stating that “nothing herein shall prevent the
registration of a mark used by the applicant which has become distinctive of the
applicant’s goods in commerce.”  15 U.S.C. § 1052(f) (1982).
67. See supra note 65 and accompanying text.
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II. THE E-I-G MOVEMENT IN E-COMMERCE
A. Brief Overview of E-Commerce
In the last few years the transformation of cyberspace68 has created
an open system which fosters new innovations, creates numerous
opportunities, and generates numerous uncertainties.69  The Internet,
particularly the World Wide Web, (“the Web”)70 has enabled the
growth of e-commerce by providing consumers, businesses, and
trading partners with the ability to connect to a global network of
computers.71
The rapid growth of e-commerce is evidenced by the creation of
more than twenty-one million websites in a period of less than five
years72 and the substantial investment in sales, transactions,
                                                          
68. See Robert Hobbes Zakon, Hobbes’ Internet Timeline v5.2, at http://www.
zakon.org/robert/internet/timeline/ (visited Feb. 20, 2001) (describing significant
advances in Internet technology in recent years).
69. See generally Mark Cooper, Open Access to the Broadband Internet:  Technical and
Economic Discrimination in Closed, Proprietary Networks, 71 U. COLO. L. REV. 1011, 1013-
15 (2000) (discussing the control access issue on the Internet); Office of the New
York State Attorney General Eliot Spitzer, From Wall Street to Web Street:  A Report on the
Problems and Promise of the Online Brokerage Industry Prepared by Investor Protection Internet
Bureau & Securities Bureau (Nov. 22, 1999), 1189 PLI/CORP 355 (June 2000)
(discussing the risks and limitations of online trading); Debra A. Valentine, Privacy on
the Internet:  The Evolving Legal Landscape, 16 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH.
L.J. 401, 403 (2000) (arguing that self-regulation, consumer education, technological
empowerment, and legislation are needed to ensure meaningful privacy protection
on the evolving Net); Tara C. Hogan, Now that the Floodgates Have Been Opened, Why
Haven’t Banks Rushed Into the Certification Authority Business? 4 N.C. BANKING INST. 417,
419 (2000) (arguing that growth in e-commerce requires a level of trust in the
security of the messages businesses send over the Net).
70. See generally TIM BERNERS-LEE, WEAVING THE WEB (1999) (discussing the
differences between the “Internet” and the “World Wide Web”).
The Internet (“Net”) is a network of networks.  Basically it is made from
computers and cables . . . The Web is an abstract (imaginary) space of
information.  On the Net, you find computers—on the Web, you find
documents, sounds, videos . . . information.  On the Net, the connections are
cables between computers; on the Web, connections are hypertext links.  The
Web exists because of programs which communicate between computers on the
Net.  The Web could not be without the Net.  The Web made the Net useful
because people are really interested in information (not to mention knowledge
and wisdom!) and don’t really want to have to know about computers and cables.
Tim Berners-Lee Personal Web Page, available at http://www.w3.org/People/
Berners-Lee/FAQ.html (last visited July 14, 2001).
71. See Jane Kaufman Winn, Open Systems, Free Markets, and Regulation of Internet
Commerce, 72 TULANE L. REV. 1177 (1998) (describing the impact of the open
networks of the Internet on commercial transactions and arguing that legislation
regulating Internet technology will harm consumers).
72. In January 1996, there were only 100,000 web sites on the World Wide Web.
Less than five years later, as of September 2000, there are 21,166,912 web sites on the
World Wide Web.  See Zakon, supra note 68 (providing a comprehensive timeline of
significant developments in the evolution of the Internet).
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advertising, and expenditures on the Internet.73  For example, retail
sales over the web in 1998 were $9 billion,74 in the first quarter of
2000 retail e-commerce sales75 were approximately $5.2 billion76 and
are expected to grow to $1.1 trillion by 2002.77 In 1994, business-to-
business78 e-commerce sales were in excess of $114 billion and are
projected to reach $1.5 trillion by 2004.79
Rushing to the Internet, companies create web sites to serve as
storefronts, offices, headquarters, marketing, and distribution centers
in cyberspace.80  Using the worldwide network of computers through
the Internet, companies create and apply their new business models
to the fast changing online commerce.81  Many traditional, brick-and-
                                                          
73. According to The Industry Standard’s Internet Economy Indicators for the
week of August 21 to 25, 2000, there were 54.9 million web users, 4.1 million orders
for goods sold at about 70% of online retailers, the average amount spent on
Internet banner ads per company that advertised online is $29,000.  See Nicholas G.
Carr, Giant Steps, THE INDUS. STANDARD, Sept. 4, 2000, at 122.
74. See Steven Andersen, Six E-commerce Pitfalls and How to Avoid Them, 9/00 CORP.
LEGAL TIMES 1.
75. Retail e-commerce sales are sales of goods and services over the Internet.
Retail e-commerce sales do not include on-line travel services, financial brokers, or
ticket sales. See U.S. Dep’t of Commerce News, Monthly Retail Surveys Branch, U.S.
Census Bureau (May 31, 2000), available at http://www.census.gov/mrts/www/
current.html.
76. See id.
77. See Andersen, supra note 74, at 1 (reporting that web retail sales are expected
to top $1.1 trillion by 2002).
78. Unlike retail e-commerce (“B2C”), in which e-companies’ products and
services are aimed directly at the traditional consumers, business to business (“B2B”)
e-commerce is a “system of suppliers, distributors, commerce services providers,
infrastructure providers and customers that use the Internet for communications
and transactions.” Don Tapscot, Manager’s Journal: Virtual Webs Will Revolutionize
Business, WALL ST. J., Apr. 24, 2000, at A38.  Consequently, among other benefits,
B2B e-commerce allows companies to streamline and augment supply chain
processes to their business customers. See U.S. Department of Commerce, The Digital
Economy II, chp. 1, Electronic Commerce in the Digital Economy (1999), available at
http://www.ecommerce.gov/ede/ chapter1.html (last visited July 14, 2001).
79. See Goldman Sachs, E-Commerce/Internet, B2B: 2B or Not 2B?, pt.1 (Nov. 12,
1999) (discussing recent statistics relating to business-to-business e-commerce),
available at http://www.gs.com/hightech/research/b2b.
80. See generally A. Michele Dickerson, From Jeans to Genes:  The Evolving Nature of
Property of the Estate, 15 BANKR. DEV. J. 285, 299-300 (1999) (noting that many
cybercompanies have their presence on the Net through their web pages and many
cybercompanies own very few tangible assets). For example, Amazon.com owns no
stores and few tangible assets, yet, it is worth as much as Barnes & Noble, Inc. and
Borders Groups, Inc. combined.  See also Marc S. Friedman & Jonathan Bick, The
Electronic Commerce Landscape, 198 N.J. LAW. 14 (Aug. 1999) (reporting First Data
Merchants Services and IBM are building online storefronts that provide e-
commerce services such as payments, credit-card process, and shipping
coordination).
81. An example of companies that have been capitalizing on the Internet
medium are e-learning companies.  E-learning companies offer distance learning
and training of corporate employees.  In 1999 alone e-learning companies received
approximately $1.2 billion in private capital and $302 million in public equity.  The
corporate e-learning market is expected to reach $11 billion in 2003.  See Elizabeth
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mortar companies rapidly expanded their businesses to the Internet82
to take advantage of Internet-based technology.83 An example of an
Internet-based company is Priceline.com.  The Internet enables
Priceline.com to use a proprietary system to analyze quickly the vast
data needed in its reverse auction sales.84
New web sites with new business models are developing quickly on
the Internet. New think-tank groups, such as Walker Digital, Corp.,
are filing business method patent applications at the rate of one
patent application every two weeks.85  Other Internet companies are
shifting from business-to-customers operations to business-to-business
practices86 and from Internet service providers to commerce service
                                                          
Lamb, E-learning Goes the Distance, RED HERRING, Oct. 30, 2000, at 62-63.  In fact,
Internet-based companies that want to remain successful must be willing to cultivate,
change and move from one business model to another.  See Nicholas G. Carr, Giant
Steps, THE INDUS. STANDARD, Sept. 4, 2000, at 139.
82. See Andersen, supra note 74 (noting bulk of companies doing business on-line
are brick-and-mortar companies that “have integrated their web sites into long-
standing corporate missions,” however, these companies “may be at particular risk
for online liability because, unlike dot-coms, their operations are not exclusively
tailored around the Internet”).
83. See Christian N. Watson, Notes & Comments, The Growth of Internet-Only Banks:
Brick and Mortar Branches Are Feeling the “Byte”, 4 N.C. BANKING INST. 345, 353-56
(2000) (discussing how brick-and-mortar banks are moving to the Net by extending
their existing bank brand to the Net or creating a new entity that distances itself from
the parent company); Don Tapscot, Manager’s Journal: Virtual Webs Will Revolutionize
Business, WALL ST. J., Apr. 24, 2000, at A38 (reporting that General Motors, Ford and
DaimlerChrysler are planning “to move all their business, involving more than $250
billion and 60,000 suppliers, to the Internet [replacing] a bloated procurement
process built on phone calls and fax machines”).
84. “Reverse auction” was defined as a “process initiated by the prospective
purchaser who solicits bids.  After the low bidder is identified, the other bidders have
an opportunity to rebid until the buyer is satisfied it has secured the best terms,
which usually means the lowest price.”  Outboard Marine Corp. v. Peretel, 461 F.
Supp. 384, 389 (D.C. Del. 1978).  Priceline’s reverse auction is an Internet-based
process that allows multi-party interaction: consumers naming their own prices for
airline tickets or hotel rooms; website servers facilitating the bidding-matching
process; service provider (hotel or airline) responding to the consumer’s bid.  See
Robert E. Lyon & Christopher A. Vanderlaan, Method Madness, LOS ANGELES LAWYER,
Oct. 2000, at 28.  Priceline.com owns the reverse auction and other Internet patents
(5,897,620 Method and Apparatus for the Sale of Airline-Specified Flight Tickets;
6,041,308 System and Method for Motivating Submission of Conditional Purchase
Offers; 6,085,169 Conditional Purchase Offer Management System; 6,108,639
Conditional Purchase Offer Management System for Collectibles).  See United States
Patent and Trademark Office (Oct. 4, 2000), available at http://www.uspto.gov.
85. See Julia Angwin, “Business Method” Patents, Key to Priceline, Draw Growing
Protest, WALL ST. J., Oct. 3, 2000, at B1 (reporting that patent applications for
software and business methods are soaring, for example, Walker Digital’s portfolio of
66 patents and 400 pending patent applications are valued at $1 billion).
86. See Suein Hwang & Mylene Mangalindan, Watch This Space:  Yahoo’s Grand
Vision for Web Advertising Takes Some Hard Hits, WALL ST. J., Sept. 1, 2000, at A1
(discussing how Yahoo’s new Corporate Yahoo platform aims to move Yahoo into the
business-to-business market by integrating Yahoo’s portal to companies’ internal Web
networks in light of possible failure of Web-based advertising); Tapscot, supra note
83, at A38:
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providers.87
The explosive growth of millions of websites has taught Internet
companies that the prospect of luring potential customers to its site,
maintaining the customers’ interest, and developing loyal, return
customers are daunting tasks.88  The ability to anticipate trends and
be ahead of the competition is also key to survival in e-commerce.89
The dot.com companies, to thrive in the e-commerce economy, must
do more than grow quickly, they must be profitable.90  Dot.com
companies attempt to distinguish themselves from competitors
                                                          
B2B exchanges pave the way for the new model of the company in the digital
economy.  The vertically integrated industrial corporation is giving way to a form
of wealth creation called the business web. A b-web is a distinct system of
suppliers, distributors, commerce services providers, infrastructure providers and
customers that use the Internet for communications and transactions.
Id.
87. See Chana R. Schoenberger, Don’t Go There, FORBES, Oct. 2, 2000, at 174
(discussing commerce service providers).  Commerce service providers build and run
others’ storefronts, handling merchandising, inventory, and shipping. Commerce
service providers sites such as Vitessa, Iconomy and Escalate charge an up-front
development fee of $10,000-$100,000, plus a percentage of sales commission from
content sites that once used to refer their users to online retailers in exchange for a
five to seven percent cut of any sale. See id.  The deals between content sites and
online retailers are referred to as “affiliate deals.”  Affiliate deals reportedly account
for $5 billion in annual sales, or 13% of Web retailer commerce. Amazon, for
example, has about 430,000 affiliates. See id.
88. See Stephanie Gruner, Web Failure boo.com Gets a New Lease on Life as a Unit of
fashionmall.com, WALL ST. J., Sept. 6, 2000, at B8 (reporting that the old boo.com’s
failure as an e-tailing company cost investors $135 million and now the new boo.com
site “hasn’t sold anything for months”); Che Odom, VirtualBank Takes Big Step Toward
Real Operations with Co-Branding Deals, MIAMI DAILY BUS. REV., June 27, 2000, at 1
(reporting many Internet banks have failed and how the new VirtualBank’s complete
suite of banking products and services coupled with immediate customer service
through chat, e-mail and telephone services would give an edge over other online
banks).
89. See Nikhil Deogun & Keith Johnson, Lycos, Terra Networks of Spain Discuss
Merger to Create Global Internet Portal, WALL ST. J., May 15, 2000, at A3 (“[I]n the
Internet world, even more than in bricks-and-mortar boardrooms, the ability to
anticipate trends and stay one step ahead of the competition is crucial not just to
growth, but survival.”).
90. See Pete Henig & Nicole Sperling, The Fantasy World of Jeff Bezos, RED HERRING,
Oct. 30, 2000, at 42-44 (reporting that Amazon.com took $1.5 billion in losses on
$3.6 billion in revenue); Jim Kerstetter, Finding the Right Formula, BUS. WK., Oct. 23,
2000, at 44-45 (“Ever since the Net craze began, dot-coms have relied on outside
capital and hyped valuations to feed their expansion plans.  Now that the bubble has
burst and venture capitalists have lost their enthusiasm, many dot-coms are stranded
with little prospect of ever making it.”); David Lipschultz, Growing Pains, RED
HERRING, Oct. 30, 2000, at 222-27 (observing that Internet startups that fail to
manage growth, making mistakes such as Amazon’s “money-losing revenue” model,
wrong products, wrong direction, wrong manufacturing process, wrong employees
and lack of office space that occur in a short period can mean corporate death);
Mark Roberti, B-to-B:  Evolution, Not Revolution, THE INDUS. STANDARD, Sept. 4, 2000, at
79-80 (“With venture capitalists and Wall Street looking for profits—or at least the
prospect of profits—independent market makers need to find new sources of
revenue.  The answer, for some at least, is to transform themselves into application
service providers.”).
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through “branding” in the Internet.91
B. “Branding” the E-Commerce Way: Here Comes E-I-G
It is common for some dot.com companies to spend millions of
dollars on on-line advertising and branding campaigns. Branding is a
marketing tool used by companies to portray a consistent and
effective image in the market place, i.e. the Nike symbol or Coca-
Cola’s signature red and white colors.92 Given the crowded dot.com
web, startup companies in the e-commerce economy choose to focus
most of their attention on branding through quick growth.93  Many
dot.com companies are selling products and services at their web sites
without making any profits.94  Other dot.com companies give away
devices or hardware with the hope that consumers will remember
their domain name and web site and ultimately complete a sales
transaction with the dot.com companies.95
For example, Virgin Megastore Online offered Internet customers
a free WebPlayer, a keyboard, and flat-panel display with Web access
                                                          
91. See James F. Haggerty, Marketing Your Firm Toward Common Sense Branding
Strategies, N.Y. L.J., Mar. 14, 2000, at 5 (observing that the “rise of the Internet and
other technologies, in fact, is where this focus on ‘branding’ all began”); Odom,
supra note 88 (reporting that the use of such names as Compaqvirtualbank.com,
EMCvirtualbank.com and Textronvirtualbank.com will enable VirtualBank and its
business partners Compaq, EMC Corp. and Textron Financial Corp. to appeal to
worker loyalty and that the new banking arrangement “will be a useful inducement
to attract and retain talent” at the participating companies); Joe Starkey, Brand-
Building More Important to Web Sites; Online Companies Scramble to Stand Out From Crowd,
STAR TRIB. Minneapolis, MN, Jan. 24, 2000, at 5D (“In the famous cocktail-party
scene in 1967’s landmark film ‘The Graduate,’ a helpful older man whispers a single
word of business advice to callow, befuddled young Benjamin, played by Dustin
Hoffman: ‘Plastics.’  Remake the movie today and you’d have to change the line to
‘Branding.’”); Andrew J. Trackman & Robert M. Stern, Federal Circuit Ruling, Largely
Ignored, Impacts Patent Infringement Equation; Effect Predicted Particularly for Business
Method Litigation, N.Y. L.J., Apr. 17, 2000, at S7 (noting “the key to success on the
Internet turns on branding and the first-mover advantage”).
92. See Haggerty, supra note 91.
93. See Dickerson, supra note 80 at 299 (observing that “[c]ybercompanies seem
to be highly valued because of investors’ view of their projected growth, not because
of current profits”); Scott McNealy, It’s Like Businesses Built on Metaphors Still Need
Value, FORBES ASAP, Oct. 2, 2000, at 47 (“Startups may put rapid growth ahead of
profits for a time, but eventually they will have to return to the true nature of
business.  They will have to charge more than the cost of the goods and services they
deliver, and make a profit.”).
94. See Dickerson, supra note 80, at 299 (noting that most cybercompanies “have
generated little earnings and, thus, have never made a profit”); see also Hwang &
Mangalindan, supra note 86, at A1 (reporting that Yahoo is one of the few dot-com
companies that earn profits).
95. See, e.g., Alexei Oreskovic, Take My Device, Please, THE INDUS. STANDARD, Sept.
4, 2000, at 146-48 (“[b]usinesses are giving away so-called information appliances to
bring customers to their Web sites.  This motley group of devices runs the gamut
from wireless two-way pagers to flat-panel Internet terminals.  All share the ability to
access a site’s content and services.”).
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to surf the Internet, send e-mail, or shop online.96 The
manufacturer’s regular price for a WebPlayer is around $400.97
Virgin Megastore Online required its customers to use the WebPlayer
ten (10) hours a month or they must return the machine.98  The
company received commissions from its strategic partners, including
Expedia, Gap.com, and Tickets.com.  Each time a WebPlayer user
bought a ticket from Tickets.com or clothing item from Gap.com,
Virgin Megastore Online takes a commission.99 Other dot-com
companies such as ebay.com,100 fidelity.com,101 sega.com,102
ticketmaster.com,103 weather.com,104 and zdtv.com105 offer various free
Internet appliances to their customers.  A dot.com company that is
even more aggressive in its tactics to lure and retain loyal surfers to its
web site is Iwon.com.106  Iwon.com gave millions of dollars in
sweepstakes to visitors who use its site to surf the Internet.107
For many dot.com start-ups, having the right domain name is a
significant step toward branding.108  Some companies believe that
                                                          
96. See id. (reporting that the company distributed 10,000 webplayers to
customers).
97. See id.
98. See id. (stating that while consumers must use the machine, they are not
required to spend money shopping on it).
99. See id. (remarking how “the company effectively owns the webplayer surfers
and profits from their every move”).
100. See id. (noting that eBay gives its customers eBay branded pagers that will
alert owners when they have been outbid on an auction and when an auction has
closed).
101. Fidelity Investments gives its customers the RIM Interactive 950 two-way
pagers that allows their InstantBroker customers to check their account information,
receive stock alerts and trade stocks.  Fidelity Investments also participates in a
program in which its customers receive free IBM desktop Internet terminals.  See id.
at 147-48.
102. See Dean Takahashi, Sega Will Give Away Dreamcast Players to Lure Subscribers to
the Web, WALL ST. J., Apr. 4, 2000, at B1 (reporting that starting in August 2000,
Sega.com will give its Dreamcast video game console free to customers who subscribe
to Sega Web services for two years at $21.95 a month).
103. Ticketmaster gives its customers the branded Ticketmaster.com pagers that
alert owners when tickets for their favorite artists or events are available.  See
Oreskovic, supra note 95, at 148.
104. Weather.com gives its customers the branded Weather.com pagers with
personalized, location-specific weather alerts and forecasts.  See id.
105. ZDTV gives its customers webcams to participate in live video conferences
with people working on its TV show and site.  See id.
106. See http://www.iwon.com/ (visited on Dec. 11, 2000) (displaying an on-line
sweepstakes website).
107. See Nanette Byrnes, Can iwon Keep Winning?, BUS. WK., Oct. 9, 2000, at 192
(daily visitors to the Iwon site is 2.9 million and Iwon has given away $26 million to
more than 1,000 people).
108. See Lee J. Plave, ACPA Gives Franchisors New Weapon in War Against
Cybersquatting, 6 LEADER’S FRANCHISING BUS. & L. ALERT 1 (Jan. 2000) (recognizing
domain names have become an important part of branding and commercial
identification); Wingfield, supra note 6 (reporting that budding Internet
entrepreneurs who search for the right name of their new companies encounter a
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paying the high price for the right domain name will reduce the cost
of advertising a new Web site.109  Others even attempt to secure a
domain name first, then develop the business around the name.110
Often the right domain name is the name that describes the products
or services offered at the web site.111  Indeed, having a memorable or
easily accessible domain name that users relate to a product or on-
line service is considered owning one of the most valuable cyber-
assets.112
When potential consumers surf the Internet by using common
names for products or services, they will quickly be linked to sites
where the domain name is the name of the product or services
offered for sale.  These are generic or G-domain names.  Examples of
G-domain names include sex.com, business.com, loans.com,
bingo.com, drug.com and university.com.
In addition to the G-domain names, there are domain names with
the “e” prefix.  According to one estimate, there are about 110,000
domain names with this prefix.113  The “e” prefix stands for
“electronic” and is synonymous with “online” or “high tech.”114  Like
the G-domain names, E-domain names are in high demand.115  E-
                                                          
“nightmare” process because most memorable dot-com addresses are no longer
available and selecting a difficult to remember company name is a bad idea).
109. See Johnson, supra note 3, at A1 (reporting companies such as Idealab in
Pasadena will pay one million dollars for domain names with the belief that the
name will offset the advertising cost).
110. See id. (reporting Marketvision’s “game plan:  Secure domain names first,
then develop appropriate businesses around them”).
111. See Jonathan Lambeth, The-telegraph.com:  Domainia as Net Names Go for
Millions, THE DAILY TELEGRAPH, June 8, 2000, available at 2000 WL 21888662
(reporting the offer of 4.4 million pounds for e-buy.com, an inactive web site for “an
international department store,” has been turned down while BrainwareMedia paid
$8 million for mp3audiobooks.com to a Boston resident).
112. See Thomas E. Weber, Register.Com Aims to Market Internet Addresses to Everyone,
WALL ST. J., Apr. 1, 1999, at B7.
Domain names have evolved into one of the Internet’s most important
commodities—and an increasingly scarce resource.  Though the universe of
online addresses is theoretically unlimited, the best addresses get snapped
up quickly.  A latecomer might find himself stuck with an unwieldy address
like “joespizzaofbrooklyn.com” instead of the easier to type, and remember,
“joes.com.”
Id.
113. See Thomson & Thomson, supra note 8 (reporting that there are 4,900
trademark filings and 110,000 domain names begin with “e”).
114. See Johnson, supra note 3, at A1 (reporting that companies who add “e” or “i”
to domain names are hoping their names “sound high-tech and that e-buy.com, e-
sell.com, e-tail.com, e-toys.com and i-tail.com are all not available on the primary
domain name market”).
115. See Lambeth, supra note 111 (reporting on current prices for several popular
domain names); David Montgomery, Owner of 63 pound e-name turns down 4.4m pound
offer from U.S., SCOTSMAN, June 3, 2000, at 5 (noting that the owner of e-buy.com
rejected a California company’s offer to buy the domain name, even when the
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domain names include etoy.com (selling toys on the Internet),
erealty.com (real estate business), emortgages.com (online mortgage
company), ebank.com (online banking services), and etrade.com
(online brokerage trading services). Though not as popular as e-
domain names, domain names with the “i” prefix are also gaining
popularity.  The “i” prefix stands for “Internet” and, as with the “e”
prefix, is synonymous with “online” or “high tech.”116  Examples of i-
domain names include iWireless.com, currently being offered for sale
at $500,000, and iAutos.com, which is offered for sale at $250,000.117
Generic domain names are presently seen as the most coveted
virtual real estate on the Internet.118  The more generic the better.
Internet surfers frequently use simple, generic words to search for a
site.119  Thus, the generic quality of a domain name dramatically
increases its value.120  Start-up dot.com companies are often willing to
pay hefty prices for generic domain names that describe their on-line
product in lieu of spending even more on a branding campaign to
increase name recognition.
The demand for simple generic domain names has caused the
monetary value of G-domain names to skyrocket.121  Many individuals
and companies registered generic domain names in the early stages
of e-commerce without ever using the names.122  The owners of
generic domain names are now cashing in on the current demand.
In addition, there are numerous Internet companies specializing in
domain name brokerage.  These domain name brokers usually take a
ten percent commission for the sale of a domain name to the highest
                                                          
company increased its original offer from 2 million pounds to 4.4 million pounds).
116. See Johnson, supra note 3 (reporting that “e” and “i” domain names denote
high tech).
117. See Greatdomains.com (Oct. 23, 2000) (featuring iWireless.com and
iAutos.com among the new high-profile domain names), available at
http://www.greatdomains.com.
118. See Johnson, supra note 3, at A1 (noting that most of the obvious names have
been taken, either by online companies or by entrepreneurs hoping to sell the
names to online start-ups).
119. See Wendy R. Leibowitz, Going Once, Going Twice-Sold! Domain Name Market
Heats Up, NAT’L L.J., Mar. 28, 1998, at  B6 (commenting that this practice increases
the value of generic domain names).
120. See id. (discussing the criteria for appraising the value of domain names).
121. See Wingfield, supra note 6 and accompanying text.  Wingfield also professes
that a demand for and scarcity of memorable domain names has resulted in a “mad
land grab,” causing the inflated prices.  See id.
122. Procter & Gamble, for example, was one of the companies that registered
numerous domain names.  The Wall Street Journal reported that Procter & Gamble will
offer a collection of potentially lucrative names such as romantic.com, sensual.com,
beautiful.com, sensitive.com, dry.com, scent.com, thirst.com, and nails.com for sale
through GreatDomains.com. See P&G to Unload 100 Names of Sites Through Auction,
WALL ST. J., June 29, 2000, at C18.
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bidder.123  Currently, there are dozens of domain name auction sites
including greatdomains.com, bestdomains.com, domains.com, and
domainmart.com.124  Some sites have taken a step further by
capitalizing on their success of selling domain names to reach out to
new investors who would pay $10,000 to $100,000 to be an investor in
domain names.125  Domain Name Investors recently announced a
plan to seek domain name investors because the high appreciation
value in some domain names have out-performed commodities,
stocks, or bonds.126  Other domain name brokerage web sites receive
millions of dollars from venture capitalists as the domain name
market becomes a significant virtual real estate market.127
A second level domain name128 in the “.com” suffix is viewed as the
must-have Internet address.129  Since most if not all memorable names
in the “.com” top level domain are no longer available on the primary
market,130 other top level domain names such as “.tv” and “.cc” have
                                                          
123. See Rachael King, What’s Wireless.com Worth?  Maybe $15M, INTERACTIVE WK.
FROM ZDWIRE, Jan. 31, 2000, available at 2000 WL 4064606  (reporting that
SiteJockey.com will get a ten percent commission on the sale price of the
Wireless.com domain name).
124. See Leibowitz, supra note 119, at B6 (listing several domain name brokers
available on the Internet); see also Wingfield, supra note 6, at R14 (noting that,
according to Greatdomains.com, online domain brokerages have more promise than
traditional real estate brokerages).
125. See Domain Name Investors to Spread the Wealth, PR NEWSWIRE, June 1, 2000
(announcing that domain name investors will bring in investors who must make a
minimum investment of $10,000 per entity).
126. See id. To capitalize on the expanding domain name secondary market,
Afternic.com has established a domain name portal that publishes URLy Indicator, a
domain name industry newsletter and provides a comprehensive source of resources
to domain name investors.  See Afternic.com (providing extensive information about
the exchange of domain names), available at http://afternic.com (last visited Jan. 2,
2001); see also First Domain Name Industry Newsletter Launched, BUS. WIRE, Feb. 11, 2000
(noting that afternic.com’s newsletter provides insight into the rapidly expanding
domain name market).
127. See Karen Kaplan, Domain Name Trade Gives Rise to Whole New Breed of Brokers
Internet:  They’re Betting that the Buying and Selling of Web Addresses Will Be Big Business for
a Long Time to Come, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 13, 1999, at C1 (explaining that the internet
domain name Business.com sold for $7.5 million and several other domain names
have received bids in excess of $1 million).
   128.  Generally, domain names consist of a second-level domain which is typically
the name of a company—such as Texaco, Microsoft, or Blockbuster—followed by a
period (the “dot”), and a top-level domain which indicates the nature of the
company such as “com” (commercial), “edu” (educational), “org” (non-profit
organizations), “net” (network providers), “gov” (government), and “mil” (military).
129. See Wingfield, supra note 6, at R14 (“In the world of online real estate, the
‘dot-com’ at the end of ForMyHome.com and other Web sites’ addresses is the most
fashionable ZIP Code for Internet businesses.  It’s a suffix that has become a
universal signifier for all things Internet.  Other so-called top-level domains-–
particularly ‘dot-net’ are considered far less desirable by Web entrepreneurs.”).
130. See Keep the Game Fair, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 21, 2000, at B8 (noting that there is a
shortage of “.com” domain names).
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become the latest fad in new Internet address registrations.131  Some
domain names in “.tv”132 like free.tv, china.tv, and net.tv have been
sold for initial annual registration fees of $100,000.133  Similarly,
memorable domain names in the “.cc”134 are demanding high price
tags.135 For example, Beauty.cc was reportedly sold for $1 million by
webdomains.cc.136
The desire for an E-I-G domain name is premised on the belief that
Internet surfers who search for web sites use domain name searches
as one of the two principal means of being linked to the desired web
site.137  A surfer may search for, communicate with, and retrieve
information from various web sites using a web browser such as
Microsoft’s Internet Explorer or Netscape’s Navigator.  The surfer
can get to a web site quickly if s/he knows the domain name to enter
in the web browser. Alternatively, if the surfer does not know the
domain name, she can use a search engine such as Yahoo, Altavista,
or Lycos to get to the desired web site. The surfer enters a keyword
into a search engine and it looks for the word in “domain names,
actual text on the web page, and metatags.”138
Domain names function like telephone numbers and are believed
by Internet entrepreneurs to be valuable because they make it easier
for customers to connect to and promote the entrepreneurs’ web
                                                          
131. See Heidi Howard Tandy, Country Domain Names Are Latest Rage on Net: Never
Heard of Cocos Keeling Islands? One Company Actively Promotes Its Top-level Domain, NAT’L
L.J., Apr. 10, 2000, at B18 (noting that “.tv” and “.cc” are becoming popular on the
Internet).
132. See id. (explaining that “.tv” is the top-level domain name for the country of
Tuvalu); see also Johnson, supra note 3, at A1 (reporting Idealab paid the nation of
Tuvalu $50 million in royalties for rights to e-mail and domain names ending in “.tv”
and noting that Idealab is hoping to reap millions to billions of dollars in reselling
domain names in “.tv”).
133. See free.tv, china.tv, net.tv sold by dotTV for $100,000 Each; Annual Initial
Registrations Fees of $100,000 Each Makes Sales Amongst the Most Valuable in Domain
History, BUS. WIRE, Aug. 21, 2000 (reporting that the sales of free.tv, china.tv, and
net.tv represent three of the top ten domain name sales in domain history).
134. See Tandy, supra note 131, at B18 (noting that “.cc” is the country domain
name for the CoCos Keeling Islands).
135. See id. (explaining that the value of  “.cc” domain names increase daily).
136. See Peter Shinkle, In a .Com World, Island Nation’s .CC Catches On, ST. LOUIS
POST-DISPATCH, July 19, 2000, at C1 (reporting that eNIC Corp., a Seattle company
that in 1997 won the authority to issue domain names in .cc, sold beauty.cc for $1
million); see also Ronna Abramson, What Price Beauty.cc?, (noting that “Beauty.cc” sold
for $1 million which was the highest price ever for a URL without a “.com” suffix),
available at http://www.eestateagents.com/Article.htm (last visited Jan. 2, 2001).
137. See Brookfield Comm. v. W. Coast Entm’t Corp., 174 F.3d 1036, 1044-45 (9th
Cir. 1999) (noting that the two principal options for searching a particular web site
without knowing the exact domain name are either trying to guess the domain name
or using an Internet search engine).
138. See id. (explaining how search engines look for keywords).
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site.139  Some courts have granted protection to holders of vanity
telephone numbers with easy-to-remember letter equivalents.140
These courts have found that the promotion of a confusingly similar
telephone number might be considered as trademark infringement
and unfair competition.141  Whether similar protection should be
extended to E-I-G domain names is the next area for discussion.
III. PROTECTION FOR THE NEW E-I-G KIDS ON THE BLOCK
A. Trademark Protection for E-I-G Domain Names?
Since E-I-G domain names are highly valued now, a logical concern
of owners of such domain name is what type of protection is available
for such domain names.  Because domain names are primarily used
to attract Internet users to a particular site,142 domain names are
performing an initial interest function of identifying and
distinguishing a web site from other web sites.143  Accordingly, the
issues we must address are whether such functions qualify as a
trademark function, whether E-I-G domain names are valid
trademarks, and whether trademark law should protect valuable E-I-G
domain names that have been used primarily as initial website
identifiers.
The first inquiry is whether domain names, E-I-G domain names in
                                                          
139. See Lockheed Martin Corp. v. Network Solutions, Inc., 985 F. Supp. 949, 958
(C.D. Cal. 1997), aff’d, 194 F.3d 980 (9th Cir. 1999) (noting that domain names, like
telephone numbers, are valuable when they make it easier to find a trademark
holder).
140. See, e.g., Dial-a-Mattress Franchise Corp. v. Page, 880 F.2d 675, 678 (2d Cir.
1989) (holding that the plaintiff “does not lose the right to protection against
defendant’s use of a confusingly similar number and a confusingly similar set of
letters that correlate with that number on the telephone dial just because the letters
spell a generic term”); Am. Airlines, Inc. v. A-1-800-A-M-E-R-C-A-N Corp., 622 F.
Supp. 673, 686-87 (N.D. Ill. 1985) (protecting the American Airlines trademark
against the use of a confusingly similar vanity telephone number).
Other courts, however, declined to extend protection to phone numbers that
correspond to generic mnemonics.  See, e.g., Holiday Inns, Inc. v. 800 Reservation,
Inc., 86 F.3d 619, 623 (6th Cir. 1996) (concluding that defendant’s use of 1-800-
HOLIDAY did not infringe the plaintiff’s trademark in the telephone number 1-800-
HOLIDAY because the defendant never promoted the number in connection with
the HOLIDAY trademark); Dranoff-Perlstein Assoc. v. Sklar, 967 F.2d 852, 852 (3d
Cir. 1992) (holding that telephone numbers that correlated to generic terms are not
afforded trademark protection).
141. See Am. Airlines Inc., 622 F. Supp. at 686 (finding that a confusingly similar
telephone number constituted trademark infringement and common-law unfair
competition).
142. See, e.g., Lockheed Martin, 985 F. Supp. at 952 (explaining that if Internet users
know the domain name of a web site, they can access the site directly by typing the
domain name into a web browser thereby avoiding a time consuming search).
143. See id. at 956 (stating that for trademark purposes, a domain name identifies
an Internet user who offers goods or services on the Internet).
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particular, are capable of functioning as trademarks.144  The second
inquiry will focus on whether such domain names are valid
trademarks entitled to protection. To qualify for trademark
protection, however, domain names must both function as
trademarks and be distinctive.  Since the Abercrombie & Fitch
distinctiveness scale determines the level of protection for trademarks
generally, the same scale should be applied to domain names.145
1. Do E-I-G domain names function as trademarks?
To answer the first inquiry we need to look at domain names and
their functions on the Internet.  In general, a company seeking to
establish its presence in cyberspace first reserves its Internet Protocol
(“IP”) Address for its web sites.146  Because the IP Address is difficult
for users to remember when trying to reach a particular web site,
“domain name combinations” were introduced.147  Network Solutions,
Inc. (“NSI”), the largest registrar of Internet domain names,148
maintains a database of registrations and translates entered domain
name combinations into IP addresses.149  When a company registers
with NSI to receive a domain name combination, the company
submits NSI’s “template” over the Internet.150  NSI then puts the
domain name combination together with the corresponding IP
address in its database.151  When an Internet user enters a domain
                                                          
144. See id. at 956-58 (noting domain names present a special problem under the
Lanham Act because “they are used for both a non-trademark technical purpose, to
designate a set of computers on the Internet, and for trademark purposes, to identify
an Internet user who offers goods or services on the Internet”).
145. Abercrombie & Fitch v. Hunting World, Inc., 537 F.2d 4, 9-11 (2d Cir. 1976)
(evaluating trademarks based on their level of distinctiveness and their association
with particular goods or services).
146. See Name.Space, Inc. v. Network Solutions, Inc., 202 F.3d 573, 576 (2d Cir.
2000) (explaining that an IP address is a string of four sets of numbers separated by
periods); Avery Dennison Corp. v. Sumpton, 189 F.3d 868, 872 (9th Cir. 1999)
(same); see also The Domain Name System:  A Case Study of the Significance of Norms to
Internet Governance, 112 HARV. L. REV. 1657, 1660 (1999) (noting that IP addresses are
long strings of numbers that facilitate the sending of information from one network
to another).
147. See Name.Space, Inc., 202 F.3d at 576-77 (noting that due to the difficulty of
remembering numeric IP addresses a new domain name system was developed); see
also Avery Dennison Corp., 189 F.3d at 872 (explaining that domain name
combinations are used instead of IP addresses for ease of use).
148. See Name.Space, Inc., 202 F.3d at 577 (stating that NSI was the sole registrar of
“.com,” “.net,” “.org,” “.edu,” and “.gov” top level domain names).
149. See Lockheed Martin Corp. v. Network Solutions, Inc., 194 F.3d 980, 982 (9th
Cir. 1999) (noting that NSI was receiving approximately 130,000 registrations per
month and would soon lose its exclusive registrar status per a new competitive
scheme between NSI and ICANN).
150. See id. (explaining that registering with NSI to receive a domain name
combination requires the electronic submission of NSI’s template over the Internet).
151. See id. (explaining that, once a registration is approved, NSI enters the
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name to find a company, the NSI database translates the request and
routes the user to the company’s computer.152
Each domain name is unique.153  Once a company reserves its
domain name combination, no other entities can have the same
domain name, unless the company voluntarily or otherwise
relinquishes its registration.
Every domain name has a technical purpose in the Web.154 The
domain name serves as an address and Internet surfers who know the
domain name will be connected to the corresponding web site once
the domain name is typed into a web browser.155  Additionally, the
user can enter the domain name as a search engine keyword.156  The
search engine will look for keywords in places such as domain names,
actual web page text, and metatags.157  The search engine performs a
search and generates a list of sites relating to the entered keyword.158
Using the domain name purely as an Internet business locator does
not amount to trademark use of the domain name.159  In this capacity,
the domain name functions as an address directing web users to the
corresponding web pages.  The address itself neither identifies a
product’s course nor distinguishes the product from those of
others.160  Some courts have compared the technical use of domain
                                                          
domain name combination in its database in conjunction with the correct IP
address).
152. See id. (describing how NSI routes Internet users to the appropriate
computer).
153. See Brookfield Comm., Inc. v. W. Coast Entm’t Corp., 174 F.3d 1036, 1044
(9th Cir. 1999) (“Because each web page must have a unique domain name, Network
Solution checks to see whether the requested domain name has already been
assigned to someone else.  If so, the applicant must choose a different domain
name.”).
154. See Lockheed Martin Corp., 985 F. Supp. at 956 (explaining that domain names
have both a non-trademark technical purpose and a trademark purpose).
155. See Brookfield, 174 F.3d at 1044 (explaining that once a domain name is
entered into a web browser, the corresponding website will appear on the screen).
156. See id. (stating that an Internet user may seek the assistance of an Internet
search engine if the exact domain name is not known).
157. See id. at 1045 (explaining how search engines look for keywords).
158. See id. (noting that keyword search results in a list of web sites related to the
keyword).
159. See Lockheed Martin Corp., 985 F. Supp. at 956 (noting that domain names “do
not act as trademarks when they are used merely to identify a business entity”); see
also Dan L. Burk, Trademarks Along the Infobahn:  A First Look at the Emerging Law of
Cybermarks, 1 RICH. J.L. & TECH. 1 (Apr. 1, 1995) (explaining that domain names are
unprotected under trademark law if they function solely as geographic locators in
cyberspace).
160. Recognizing the limitation of domain names that function as addresses, the
Trademark Office refuses registrations of domain names as trademarks if they are
only “directional references.”  See Sabra Chartrand, Patents: The Process of Filing an
Application is Slowly Cathcing Up with the Technology Available, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 26, 1998,
at D2 (outlining restriction on registering domain names as trademarks and noting
that only domain names with marks which identify the origin of goods and services
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names to vanity telephone numbers that allow one machine to
connect to another machine.161 Both domain names and telephone
numbers “make it easier for customers to find” the company.162  Such
use, as a machine-linking function, is not trademark usage.163  Other
courts have recognized that although domain names are similar to
telephone number mnemonics, they are of greater importance
because presently there is no Internet equivalent to directory
assistance and domain names are often guessed rather than known.164
Courts have also analogized the technical use of domain names to
“trade name” use because customers use domain names to identify a
business entity.165  A domain name mirroring a corporate name may
be a “valuable corporate asset, as it facilitates communication with a
customer base.”166
Domain names have dual functions.167  In addition to the technical
function of locating a site on the Web, a domain name can function
as a trademark.168  Like trade names, domain names can function as
trademarks if they are used to identify the source of goods or
services.169 The domain names must identify a web site in a manner
that leads customers to associate the source, or sponsorship of
products, or services offered with the domain name.170  Mere
registration of a domain name is not a commercial use of the domain
name as a trademark.171
                                                          
are qualified for protection); see also Lockheed Martin Corp., 985 F. Supp. at 957 n.3
(taking judicial notice of the Trademark Office’s document regarding the Office’s
policy on registration of domain names as trademarks which states that registration is
refused if the domain name submitted functions only as a business locator on the
Internet because it does not serve a trademark function).
161. See Lockheed Martin, 985 F. Supp. at 956 (noting that domain names allow one
machine to connect to another, similar to vanity phone numbers).
162. See id. (stating that domain names are valuable to trademark holders when
they make it easier for the customer to find the trademark holder on the Internet).
163. See id. (explaining that a machine-like function is not a trademark use).
164. See MTV Networks v. Curry, 867 F. Supp. 202, 203-04 n.2 (S.D.N.Y. 1994)
(noting that domain names may be more important than telephone number
mnemonics because there is not an Internet White Pages).
165. See Lockheed Martin, 985 F. Supp. at 956 (“Domain names, like trade names,
do not act as trademarks when they are used merely to identify a business entity; in
order to infringe they must be used to identify the source of goods or services.”).
166. MTV Networks, 867 F. Supp. at 203-04 n.2 (noting the value of a domain name
that mirrors a corporate name).
167. See Lockheed Martin, 985 F. Supp. at 956 (stating that domain names function
both as non-trademarks and trademarks).
168. See id. (indicating that like trade names, domain names can function as
trademarks, and can therefore can be used to infringe trademark rights).
169. See id.
170. See id. at 956-77.
171. See id. at 957 n.3 (noting the registration of a domain name with NSI for use
on the Internet, without more, is not a commercial use of the domain name as a
trademark under the Lanham Act).
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To qualify as a trademark, the registrant of the domain name must
use the domain name at its web site to distinguish the goods or
services offered at the web site and to indicate the source of those
goods or services.172 The web site must be an active web site with a
home page and perhaps internal pages that sell products or services
at the web site.173  The web pages’ content should use the domain
name in connection with the products or services offered at the site.174
All of these domain name uses are intended to convey to Internet
consumers the relationship between the domain name and the
source or sponsorship of the goods or services offered at the web site.
2. Are E-I-G domain names valid trademarks?
Upon establishing that domain name use can be trademark use,175
the next inquiry is whether E-I-G domain names are entitled to
protection under trademark law.  Since E-I-G domain names are
mostly generic or common words, our second inquiry requires an
examination of trademark law relating to generic terms.  Sixty-three
years ago, the Supreme Court in Kellogg Co. v. National Biscuit Co.,176
developed the primary significance test in evaluating whether a
popular and successful term, “Shredded Wheat,” had become
generic.177
                                                          
172. 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (1994) defines the term “trademark” to include the
following:
any word, name, symbol, or device, or any combination thereof—used by a
person, or which a person has a bona fide intention to use in commerce and
applies to register on the principal register established by this Chapter,  to
identify and distinguish his or her goods, including a unique product, from
those manufactured or sold by others and to indicate the source of the
goods, even if that source is unknown.
Id.
173. For example, district court found trademark infringement in a case where
the defendant registered a domain name to direct Net users to the website.  Such
intent was evidenced by the defendant’s creation of the home page with information
that conveyed the impression to Net users that the plaintiff was a sponsor of the
defendant’s web site.  Planned Parenthood Fed’n of Am., Inc. v. Bucci, 42 U.S.P.Q.2d
1430, 1437-40 (S.D.N.Y. 1997), 1997 WL 133313 at 26-32.
174. Without actual “use,” courts have found that marks used in domain names do
not always qualify for protection. See Brookfield, 174 F.3d at 1052-53 (holding
defendant’s registration of the domain name, moviebuff.com, with the intent to use
the name for a searchable entertainment database service and video rental and
purchase business, failed to establish trademark use in commerce).
175. See Lockheed Martin Corp. v. Network Solutions, Inc., 985 F. Supp. 949, 958
(C.D. Cal. 1997), aff’d, 194 F.3d 980 (9th Cir. 1999) (acknowledging that domain
names can be used for trademark purposes when the name exceeds mere
recognition of a business identity and identifies the entity as the source of goods or
services).
176. 305 U.S. 111 (1938).
177. 305 U.S. at 116-18 (rejecting the plaintiff’s argument that it had exclusive
right to the term “Shredded Wheat” because the term acquired the “secondary
meaning” of the shredded wheat produced by the plaintiff’s predecessor in Niagara
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Under the primary significance test, a party seeking to prove that a
mark has become generic must show that the majority of customers
or other relevant members of the public, consider the term to
primarily signify the item, not the producer.178  This inquiry requires
the party to (1) identify the class of product or service to which use of
the trademark is relevant; (2) identify the relevant purchasing public
of the class of product; and (3) prove that the primary significance of
the mark to the relevant public is to identify the product, not the
producers.179
The primary significance test, however, is often applied by the
court in cases where the trademark at issue has become generic due to
third party use and plaintiff’s failure to police such use.  In other
cases, where the trademark at issue is inherently generic, courts apply
the “genus-species test.”180  Under the genus-species test, a term is
deemed generic if it is “the name of a particular genus or class of
which an individual article or service is but a member.”181  Courts, in
applying the genus-species test, often fail to consider the issue of
                                                          
Falls, NY).
178. See id. at 118 (determining that National Biscuit Co. had to show more than a
secondary meaning applied to it in order to establish a trade name in “Shredded
Wheat” and thus, was not entitled to exclusive use of the term because it failed to
show that the primary significance of the term was the producer, not the product).
179. See Glover v. Ampak, Inc., 74 F.3d 57, 59 (4th Cir. 1996).  See, e.g., Miller
Brewing Co. v. G. Heileman Brewing Co., 561 F.2d 75, 79 (7th Cir. 1977) (“A generic
or common descriptive term is one which is commonly used as the name or
description of a kind of goods.”); S. S. Kresge Co. v. United Factory Outlet, Inc., 598
F.2d 694, 696 (1st Cir. 1979) (“Generic terms are those which refer to a genus of
which a particular product is a species, without distinguishing its source or origin.”).
180. See Ale House Mgmt., Inc. v. Raleigh Ale House, Inc., 205 F.3d 137, 141-42
(4th Cir. 2000) (referring to the genus-species test articulated in Ashley Furniture
Indus., Inc. v. Sangiacomo N.A. Ltd., 187 F.3d 363, 369 (4th Cir. 1999)).  A generic
mark “refers to the genus or class of which a particular product is a member,” and
such a mark “can never be protected.”  Furthermore, in Ale House Mgmt., the Fourth
Circuit affirmed the district court’s finding that “ale house” is a generic mark
because it refers to institutions that serve both food and beer. See Ale House Mgmt.,
Inc., 205 F.3d at 140; see also Miller Brewing Co., 561 F.2d at 80 (declining to adopt the
plaintiff’s argument that “light beer” is not a “genus” because “light” is an adjective,
noting an adjective can be generic if it is used in its generic sense, and concluding
that if “‘light beer’ is a generic name, then ‘light’ is a generic word when used as part
of that name.”).
181. Vision Ctr. v. Opticks, Inc., 596 F.2d 111, 115 (5th Cir. 1979).  See Blinded
Veterans Ass’n v. Blinded Am. Veterans Found., 872 F.2d 1035, 1039 (D.C. Cir. 1989)
(“A generic term is one commonly used to denote a product or other item or entity,
one that indicates the thing itself, rather than any particular feature or
exemplification of it.”); see also Liquid Controls Corp. v. Liquid Control Corp., 802
F.2d 934, 936 (7th Cir. 1986) (defining a generic term as a term commonly used to
identify the genus of which the goods are a species, rather than the identity of the
product’s source, which is a trademark); Abercrombie & Fitch Co. v. Hunting World,
Inc., 537 F.2d 4, 9 (2d Cir. 1976) (“A generic term is one that refers, or has come to
be understood as referring, to the genus of which the particular product is a
species.”).
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primary significance of trademarks, i.e. whether the relevant
purchasing public views the mark primarily as a generic term or a
valid trademark.182  Such oversight ignores the plain rule that “[t]he
primary significance test is the law of the land”183 that was adopted by
the Supreme Court184 and subsequently codified by Congress.185
To address the shortcomings of the genus-species test, the Court of
Appeals for the Federal Circuit has incorporated the primary
significant inquiry into the genus-species test by developing a two-part
inquiry.186 “First, what is the genus of goods or services at issue?
Second, is the term . . . understood by the relevant public primarily to
refer to that genus of goods or services?”187 If a term is generic, it is
not entitled to trademark protection.188  If a term is descriptive,
however, it will receive protection only upon proof that the term has
acquired distinctiveness through substantial and exclusive use of the
mark in commerce and that the mark itself is a source identifier.189
                                                          
182. See Stephen R. Baird, Note, Putting the Cart Before the Horse in Assessing
Trademark Validity—Toward Redefining the Inherently Generic Term, 14 J. CORP. L. 925,
939-40 (1989) (noting that in inherently generic trademark cases, many courts and
the Patent and Trademark Office stopped at the genus-species distinctions without
considering whether the relevant purchasing public views the contested term
primarily as either a valid trademark or a generic term).
183. Genesee Brewing Co. v. Stroh Brewing Co., 124 F.3d 137, 144 (2d Cir. 1997).
A mark is not generic merely because it has some significance to the public
as an indication of the nature or class of an article.  In order to become
generic the principal significance of the word must be its indication of the
nature or class of an article, rather than an indication of its origin.
(citations omitted.)
184. See Kellogg Co. v. Nat’l Biscuit Co., 305 U.S. 111, 118 (1938) (concluding that
a plaintiff must demonstrate that the primary significance of a term, as viewed by the
general public, is the producer, not the product to establish a trade name; thus, if
the primary significance of a term is the product, it is a generic term).
185. See Trademark Clarification Act of 1984, 15 U.S.C. § 1064(3) (1994 & Supp.
1998) (“The primary significance of the registered mark to the relevant public rather
than purchaser motivation shall be the test for determining whether the registered
mark has become the generic name of goods or services . . . .”).
186. See H. Marvin Ginn Corp. v. Int’l Ass’n of Fire Chiefs, Inc., 782 F.2d 987, 990
(Fed. Cir. 1986) (establishing a test that combines the primary significance test and
the genus-species test to determine whether a mark is generic to alleviate confusion
regarding this issue).
187. See id. at 990.
188. See id. at 989 (recognizing that generic terms are simply descriptive and, thus,
can never be registered as trademarks because such terms cannot acquire
distinctiveness); see also Kellogg Co., 305 U.S. at 116 (holding no exclusive right to use
the term “Shredded Wheat” because it is a generic term “by which the biscuit in
pillow-shaped form is generally known by the public”); Park ‘N Fly, Inc. v. Dollar
Park & Fly, Inc., 469 U.S. 189, 194 (1985) (“Generic terms are not registrable”).
189. See 15 U.S.C. § 1052(f) (1994 & Supp. 1998) (noting that substantial and
exclusive use of the mark must occur for five years prior to the date on which a party
claims distinctiveness); see also Walt-W. Enters., Inc. v. Gannett Co., 695 F.2d 1050,
1057 (7th Cir. 1982) (holding that to establish a secondary meaning for a term, a
plaintiff “must show more than a subordinate meaning which applies to it.  It must
show that the primary significance of the term in the minds of the consuming public
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Indeed, the Lanham Act prohibits registration of a mark that
“when used on or in connection with the goods of the applicant is
merely descriptive,”190 unless the applicant demonstrates that the
mark acquired secondary meaning.191  A generic mark falls within this
prohibition because the “generic name of a thing is in fact the
ultimate in descriptiveness.”192  In addition, a descriptive term that is
used in its generic sense as a part of a trademark will be deemed
generic.193  For example, “[I]f ‘light beer’ is a generic name, then
‘light’ is a generic word when used as part of that name.”194
When a defendant asserts a defense of genericness and the
plaintiff’s mark is unregistered, the burden of proof is on the plaintiff
to prove that the mark is not generic.195 On the other hand, if the
mark is registered, the burden of proof is on the defendant to
establish that the registered mark is generic.196
Applying the Federal Circuit’s genus-species test to E-I-G domain
names would probably render most E-I-G domain names inherently
generic and not entitled to trademark protection.197 E-I-G domain
                                                          
is not the product but the producer.” (quoting Kellogg Co., 305 U.S. at 118)).
190. See 15 U.S.C. § 1052(e)(1) (1994 & Supp. 1998).
191. See 15 U.S.C. § 1052(e)(1) (1994 & Supp. 1998).
The Commissioner may accept as prima facie evidence that the mark has
become distinctive, as used on or in connection with the applicant’s goods in
commerce, proof of substantially exclusive and continuous use thereof as a
mark by the applicant in commerce for the five years before the date on
which the claim of distinctiveness is made.
Id.
192. H. Marvin Ginn Corp., 782 F.2d at 989 (citations omitted).
193. See H. Marvin Ginn Corp. v. Int’l Ass’n of Fire Chiefs, Inc., 782 F.2d 987, 990
(Fed. Cir. 1986) (reiterating the basic trademark principle that generic terms do not
receive trademark protections in any circumstance); In re Northland Aluminum
Prods., Inc., 777 F.2d 1556, 1559 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (“A common descriptive name is
not a trademark and is not capable of distinguishing an applicant’s goods. . . .A mark
that is merely descriptive, but not the common name of the goods, can nevertheless
be registered on the Principal Register if it has become distinctive in terms of section
2(f).”) (citations omitted).
194. Miller Brewing Co. v. G. Heilman Brewing Co., 561 F.2d 75, 80 (7th Cir.
1977).
195. See Ale House Mgmt., Inc. v. Raleigh Ale House, Inc., 205 F.3d 137, 140 (4th
Cir. 2000) (noting that Raleigh Ale House asserted that the term “ale house” is
generic and AHM did not register the term; thus, AHM bears the burden of
demonstrating the term is not generic); Mil-Mar Shoe Co. v. Shonac Corp., 75 F.3d
1153, 1156 (7th Cir. 1996) (noting that Mil-Mar failed to register the term
“Warehouse Shoes” and Shonac asserted a generic defense; therefore, the burden
was on Mil-Mar to prove that the term was not a generic, unprotected mark).
196. See Am. Online, Inc. v. AT & T Corp., 64 F. Supp. 2d 549, 562 (E.D. Va.
1999), aff’d in part, vacated in part, and remanded, 243 F.3d 812 (4th Cir. 2001)
(noting that the party seeking to cancel a registered mark on grounds that it is
generic bears the burden of proving genericness by a preponderance of evidence),
citing Glover, 74 F.3d at 59.
197. See Abercrombie & Fitch Co. v. Hunting World, Inc., 537 F.2d 4, 9 (2d Cir.
1976) (“[N]o matter how much money and effort the user of a generic term has
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names, such as wireless.com (for wireless services), ibooks.com (on-
line retail books), and emovies.com (for movies rental), readily
inform the public the genus or class of which each domain name is a
member: wireless services, books, and movies.  Most people would
immediately understand that each of these domain names refer to
those services and products.  Additionally, these domain names are
not descriptive terms because none describe the characteristic of the
goods or services.198  An owner of an E-I-G domain name would like to
argue that its domain name is descriptive because under trademark
law a descriptive term can get protection if it has acquired a
secondary meaning.199  If a domain name is an adjective, however,
that alone will not prevent it from being a generic word if the
adjective is used in its generic sense as part of a name.200  This means,
like other inherently generic trademarks, E-I-G domain names will
never be protected under trademark law.201
                                                          
poured into promoting the sale of its merchandise and what success it has achieved
in securing public identification, it cannot deprive competing manufacturers of the
product of the right to call an article by its name.”); see also J. Kohnstam, Ltd. v. Louis
Marx & Co., 280 F.2d 437, 440 (1960)  (holding that toy manufacturer J. Kohnstam,
Ltd.’s modest advertising expenditures to promote the term “matchbox” did not
transform the term from generic to trademark-protected).
198. See Lockheed Martin Corp. v. Network Solutions, Inc., 985 F. Supp. 949, 956-
58 (C.D. Cal. 1997), aff’d, 194 F.3d 980 (9th Cir. 1999) (dividing domain names into
two categories: (1) for non-trademark purposes to specify a host computer on the
Internet, and (2) for trademark purposes to identify the source of the goods or
services offered on the Internet).
199. Descriptive terms are generally not protected under trademarks, unless they
have acquired secondary meaning. See, e.g., Bada Co. v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 426
F.2d 8, 11 (9th Cir. 1970) (explaining that when trademarks are simply descriptive
and have not acquired secondary meaning, such trademarks are invalid); Walt-W.
Enters., Inc. v. Gannett Co., 695 F.2d 1050, 1050 (7th Cir. 1982) (reiterating the
following rule regarding descriptive terms: “A merely descriptive term specifically
describes a characteristic or ingredient of an article.  It can, by acquiring secondary
meaning . . . become a valid trademark.”); G. & C. Merriam Co. v. Saalfield, 198 F.
369, 373 (6th Cir. 1912) (merging the “descriptive word” and “secondary meaning”
rules to conclude that descriptive words that acquire secondary meaning can become
trademark-protected terms); In re Northland Aluminum Prods., Inc., 777 F.2d 1556,
1559 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (“A mark that is merely descriptive, but not the common name
of the goods, can nevertheless be registered on the Principal Register if it has
become distinctive in terms of section 2(f).”).
200. See Miller Brewing Co. v. G. Heilman Brewing Co., 561 F.2d 75, 80 (7th Cir.
1977) (“The fact that ‘light’ is an adjective does not prevent it from being a generic
or common descriptive word.”) (citing 2 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON
TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION § 12.2 (4th ed. 2000)) (reiterating the rule
that generic terms are open for anyone to use as part of the public domain); In re
Preformed Line Prods. Co., 323 F.2d 1007, 1008 (1963) (holding that the term
“preformed” was merely descriptive and thus, unprotected by trademark law).  See
generally 3 RUDOLF CALLMAN, THE LAW OF UNFAIR COMPETITION, TRADEMARKS, AND
MONOPOLIES §§ 70.4, 74.1 (3d ed. 1969) (reiterating that generic terms do not
receive trademark protection).
201. See Ale House Mgmt. v. Raleigh Ale House, Inc., 205 F.3d 137, 140 (4th Cir.
2000) (holding genericness as a threshold question to trademark protectability);
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3. Secondary meaning in E-I-G domain names?
If the owner of an E-I-G domain name has evidence establishing
that the generic domain name achieved secondary meaning through
extensive use, promotion, and advertising, is the generic domain
name entitled to trademark protection?  Under trademark law courts
uniformly respond that no amount of proof of secondary meaning
can convert a generic term into a valid trademark.202  The rationale
behind such refusal to grant trademark protection to generic terms
with secondary meaning is the fear that such protection may “deprive
competing manufacturers of the product of the right to call an article
by its name.”203  Moreover synonyms for a term do not mean the term
is not generic since it is common that there “may be more than one
term which the consuming public understands as designating a
category of goods.”204  In the context of the generic combination of
generic words or phrases, some courts examine whether a composite
mark simply conveys a combination of each word’s common
meaning.205  For example, “Consumer Electronics” is generic for
electronic equipment purchased and installed by the consuming
public.206 Therefore, “Consumer Electronics Monthly” is generic
                                                          
Yellow Cab Co. of Charlottesville v. Rocha, No. Civ.A.00CV-00013, 2000 WL 1130621
at *7-8 (W.D. Va. July 5, 2000) (finding that the Fourth Circuit has considered
generic trade names to be dispositive in determining whether it receives trademark
protection; hence, if the trade name is generic, it does not receive such protection).
202. See Keebler Co. v. Rovira Biscuit Corp., 624 F.2d 366, 374 (1st Cir. 1980) (“No
amount of purported proof that a generic term has acquired secondary meaning
associating it with a particular producer can transform that term into a registrable
trademark.”); Reese Pub. Co., Inc. v. Hampton Int’l Communications, 620 F.2d 7, 12
n.2 (2d Cir. 1980) (noting that evidence of secondary meaning “at most could have
established ‘de facto secondary meaning,’ which cannot suffice to convert a generic
term into a trademark”); Surgicenters of Am., Inc. v. Med. Dental Surgeries Co., 601
F.2d 1011, 1016 (9th Cir. 1979) (generic word “cannot be validly registered as a
trademark even if there is proof of secondary meaning”); CES Publ’g Corp. v. St.
Regis Publ’n Inc., 531 F.2d 11, 13 (2d Cir. 1975) (rejecting the district court’s
finding that a generic term may become a trademark if it acquires secondary
meaning, and reiterating the rule that generic terms cannot attain trademark status
in any circumstance).
203. Abercrombie & Fitch Co. v. Hunting World, Inc., 537 F.2d 4, 9 (2d Cir.
1976).
204. Loctile Corp. v. Nat’l Starch & Chem. Corp., 516 F. Supp. 190, 201 (S.D.N.Y.
1981) (finding “Super Glue,”  “instant glue,” and “ten second glue” all generic).
205. See Genesee Brewing Co., Inc. v. Stroh Brewing Co., 124 F.3d 137, 140-41 (2d
Cir. 1997) (finding “honey” added to “brown ale” is the generic “honey brown” ale);
Miller Brewing, 561 F.2d at 80-81 (holding “light”—the legal and phonetic equivalent
of the word “lite”—is a generic or common descriptive term as applied to beer and
“[i]f ‘light beer’ is a generic name, then ‘light’ is a generic word when used as a part
of that name.”); cf. Self-Realization Fellowship Church v. Ananda Church of Self-
Realization, 59 F.3d 902, 912 (9th Cir. 1995) (concluding that the district court erred
by ruling on the composite marks’ validity by examining their component parts).
206. See CES Publ’g Corp., 531 F.2d at 12 (relating that CES Publishing Corporation
claimed trademark protection of “Consumer Electronics” as used in its
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when used as a trademark for a magazine title.207
Accordingly, under trademark law, proof of secondary meaning in
E-I-G domain names cannot transform the domain names to valid
trademarks.208  Moreover, given the fact that most E-I-G domain
names have only been in use for a relatively short period of time,
owners of E-I-G domain names would probably not be able to prove
that E-I-G domain names have acquired distinctiveness or secondary
meaning.209  The burden to prove acquired distinctiveness is a heavy
burden because it entails “vigorous evidentiary requirements.”210  The
owner of an E-I-G domain name must demonstrate:
(1) advertising expenditures, (2) consumer studies linking the
mark to a source, (3) unsolicited media coverage of the product,
(4) sales success, (5) attempts to plagiarize the mark, and (6) the
length and exclusivity of the mark’s use.211
In light of the heavy burden of proving secondary meaning, most,
if not all, E-I-G domain names would not be entitled to such
protection.212
                                                          
magazine, “Consumer Electronics Monthly” and proposed magazine “Consumer
Electronics Product News”; whereas, St. Regis Publications, Inc. claimed trademark
protection of their coverage of a semi-annual “Consumer Electronics Show” or
“C.E.S.” through publication of a periodical “Consumer Electronics Product News”).
207. See id. at 13 (affirming the district court’s conclusion that the term
“Consumer Electronics” was generic and thus, lacking trademark protection).
208. See Am. Online, Inc. v. AT & T, 64 F. Supp. 2d 549, 562-65 (E.D. Va. 1999)
(holding the mark “YOU HAVE MAIL” generic even though America Online has
used the mark for almost ten years in connection with its automatic electronic mail
notification services).
209. The requirements under 15 U.S.C. § 1052(f) indicate that the owner of a
merely descriptive trademark must prove through substantial and conclusive use of
the mark in commerce for at least five years that the mark has become distinctive and
is entitled to registration.  See also CES Publ’g Corp., 531 F.2d at 13-14 (holding the
term “Consumer Electronics” a generic term describing electronic equipment and
thus plaintiff could not successfully maintain a trademark action, “even if he were the
first in the field and consumers had come to identify his products with him”).  Even
if an E-I-G domain name is descriptive, it may not have acquired a secondary
meaning at this early stage of e-commerce.  See BigStar Entm’t, Inc. v. Next Big Star,
Inc., 105 F. Supp. 2d 185, 203 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) (noting Bigstar.com has only been in
use since 1998, thus failing to establish secondary meaning because the shorter the
mark’s use, the less likely it is to have acquired secondary meaning).
210. 20th Century Wear, Inc. v. Sanmark-Stardust Inc., 747 F.2d 81, 90 (2d Cir.
1984) (quoting Ralston Purina Co. v. Thomas J. Lipton, Inc., 341 F. Supp. 129, 134
(S.D.N.Y. 1972).
211. See Thompson Med. Co. v. Pfizer Inc., 753 F.2d 208, 217 (2d Cir. 1985)
(citations omitted) (reviewing the evidentiary requirements that are considered in
determining secondary meaning); Centaur Communications, Ltd. v. A/S/M
Communications, Inc., 830 F.2d 1217, 1222 (2d Cir. 1987) (describing the factors
used to determine whether secondary meaning exists and noting that no single
factor is determinative).
212. Obviously, if an E-I-G domain name is used as an arbitrary trademark, the
domain name will receive trademark protection.  Apple.com is an uncommon use for
a common word and will be protected under trademark law, however, apple.com for
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4. E-I-G domain name trademark registrations: cancellation
Trademark registrations for E-I-G domain names may be subject to
cancellation.213  In general, a registered trademark without proof of
secondary meaning is presumed suggestive and valid.214  The burden
to prove a registered trademark generic is on the petitioner in a
cancellation proceeding or the defendant in an infringement
action.215  Courts usually cancel trademark registrations if the
trademarks have become generic.216  In recent decisions, however,
courts have ordered cancellation of registrations of trademarks that
are inherently generic, i.e., the trademarks are generic at the time of
use or filing.217
In America Online, Inc. v. AT & T, Corp.,218 the court granted
summary judgment in favor of the defendant AT & T, cancelling the
registration of America Online’s “Buddy List”219 trademark
registration on the ground that it was inherently generic.220  AOL
brought a trademark infringement suit against AT & T for its use of
the Buddy List registered trademark in connection with real time
chat services via the Internet.221  AOL received registration of the
BUDDY LIST trademark without proof of secondary meaning from
the United States Trademark Office.222  Applying the primary
                                                          
selling apples will not be protected under trademark law.  See supra notes 41-49  and
accompanying text for a discussion on arbitrary trademarks.
213. See Am. Online, 64 F. Supp. 2d at 560-61 (“Generic marks never qualify for the
protections of the Lanham Act; are not registrable; and a registered mark can be canceled
at any time upon a finding that the mark is, or has become, generic.”) (emphasis added),
aff’d in part, vacated in part, and remanded 243 F.3d 812(4th Cir. 2001).
214. See id. at 566 (noting that because the Patent and Trademark Office
registered the term “BUDDY LIST” without proof of secondary meaning, it
establishes the a strong presumption that the mark is suggestive and valid); see also
Pizzeria Uno Corp. v. Temple, 747 F.2d 1522, 1529 (4th Cir. 1984) (recognizing that
if the Patent and Trademark Office concludes that a mark is suggestive, it can
register the mark without a showing of secondary meaning).
215. See Am. Online, 64 F. Supp. 2d at 562 (“[A] party seeking cancellation of the
mark due to genericness has the burden of establishing that fact by a preponderance
of the evidence.” (citing Glover v. Ampak, Inc., 74 F.3d 57, 59 (4th Cir. 1996))
(noting that the necessary evidence can be consumer testimony and surveys, listings
and dictionaries, trade journals, as well as other media publications).
216. See Park ‘N Fly, Inc. v. Dollar Park & Fly, Inc., 469 U.S. 189, 194 (1985) (“[A]
registered mark may be canceled at any time on the grounds that it has become
generic.”).
217. See Am. Online, 64 F. Supp. 2d at 566-69 (determining that the term “BUDDY
LIST” is inherently generic term and canceling its registration).
218. 64 F. Supp. 2d 549 (E.D. Va. 1999).
219. See id. at 553 (describing “BUDDY LISTS” as America Online’s service that
provides “real-time chat” between two or more people using America Online
simultaneously to communicate).
220. See id. at 569 (concluding that no reasonable juror could decide that “BUDDY
LIST” is not generic, thus canceling its registration).
221. See id. at 554.
222. See id. at 553 (noting that AOL received its registration on June 23, 1998).
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significance test the court found that AT&T met its of showing that
the use of the term “buddy list” is generic. 223  Despite its use by
competitor AOL, the court found that a perusal of its use in the
media, and in reference books, showed that it had become a generic
term.224
For example, the court found that, regardless of which company’s
online services they are discussing, the media uses the term “buddy
list” generically to describe a list of individuals online.225  The court
concluded that the “significant use of a term by competitors in the
industry has been recognized, along with dictionary evidence, as
indicating genericness, . . . the only reasonable conclusion which
could be drawn is that BUDDY LIST is generic.”226  The court
declined to consider whether the mark has obtained a secondary
meaning because such inquiry is not relevant when determining
whether a term is generic.227  On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals
for the Fourth Circuit vacated the District Court’s decision because
cancellation of the trademark registration at the summary judgment
stage is not appropriate.228  Evidence such as the certificate of
registration establishes a question of material fact that should be
resolved at trial.229
Under existing case law, the trademark registration of an E-I-G
domain name would be cancelled on the ground of being generic.
An owner of such trademark registration may attempt to argue that
unlike other generic terms, a generic domain name with “e” or “i”
prefix is not a generic term because it is not a dictionary word.  For
example, etoys or etoys.com are coined terms.  Although dictionaries
are not currently including generic terms with “e” or “i” prefixes,
these prefixes have become ordinary parts of language and they are
“signifiers people understand and recognize.”230  It is now common to
                                                          
223. See id. at 567-69.
224. See Am. Online, 64 F. Supp. 2d at 567-69.
225. See id. at 569.
226. See id.
227. See id.
   228.   See Am. Online, Inc. v. AT & T Corp., 243 F.3d 812, 814 (4th Cir. 2001).
   229.   See id.; cf. Liquid Controls Corp. v. Liquid Control Corp., 802 F.2d 934, 936
7th Cir. 1986) (affirming summary judgment and finding “liquid control” is a
generic term).  The Seventh Circuit held that while a contestable federal registration
is prima facie evidence that the term “liquid control” is not generic, such
presumption is rebuttable when the defendant presents sufficient evidence of
genericness.  Id.  In addition, to overcome the presumption the defendant must
demonstrate that there is no genuine issue of material fact as to genericness. Id.  In
the face of such evidence, the plaintiff trademark registration holder may not simply
rely upon registration to preclude summary judgment.  Id. at 938.
230. Michael Zeitlin, Associate Professor of English at the University of British
Columbia, quoted by Jim Conley, What’s in a Hyphen?, BUS. FROM ZDWIRE, July 1,
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see newspapers, magazines, and advertisements containing “e” or “i”
prefixes.231  Internet companies and consumers understand and
recognize that the “e” prefix is an abbreviation for “electronic,” the
“i” prefix for “Internet” and both prefixes denote “online” or “high-
tech.”232
Thus, an online retail store that sells toys on the Internet should
not have the exclusive right to use generic words, such as toys.com,
etoys.com, or itoy.com.  Such monopolies would deprive competitors
from using generic words that are necessary to do business.233
Generic terms belong to the public.  Exclusive rights in generic terms
could render the public speechless, a notion that is at odds with that
which trademark law intends to promote.234 Additionally, granting
trademark exclusivity to generic words, such as etoys, contradicts the
existing domain name assigning system and ICANN’s Uniform
Dispute Resolution Policy (“UDRP”).235  Domain names like etoy and
etoys are registered on a first come, first serve basis.236 Commercial
                                                          
2000, available at 2000 WL 2000408. See also Johnson, supra note 3, at A1 (reporting
“e” and “i” prefixes suggest Internet and high-tech).
231. A recent issue of the Business Week (Oct. 23, 2000) contains words such as e-
books, e-quipped, e-business, e-marketplace, ebiz, e-tailing, e-tailers, epals, e-stores, e-
shoppers, e-distribution, e-procurement, e-superstores, e-commerce, e-mails and e-
empire.
232. See Conley, supra note 230 (noting that the “e” prefix and punctuation
associated with domain names are now part of “ordinary language”); Glen
Gundersen, War of the Words? Using Generic Terms in dot-com Names is at Odds with a
Basic of Trademark Law:  Such terms can Never be Protected, NAT’L L.J., May 1, 2000, at C1
(noting the “e” and “i” prefixes are “models of economy because they give a mark an
Internet flavor while using the absolute minimum number of letters.”).
233. See Kellogg Co. v. Nat’l Biscuit Co., 305 U.S. 111, 116-17 (1938) (stating that
there is no exclusive right to use a generic term that belongs to the public).
234. See Ill. High Sch. Assoc. v. GTE Vantage Inc., 99 F.3d 244, 247 (7th Cir. 1996)
(arguing that trademark law does not allow an owner to remove from the public
domain generic terms which competitors and the public at large are using to denote
other products and thus render their competitors and customers “speechless”).
235. See ICANN’s UDRP, at www.icann.org/udrp/drp-policy-24oct99.htm.;
Allocation Network v. Gregory, WIPO Case No. D2000-0016 (Mar. 24, 2000) (the
domain name allocation.com is generic or descriptive and the registration and
reselling of the domain name “may constitute use of the domain name in a bona fide
offering of goods or services”); General Machine Products Prime domains, NAF Case
No. FA92531 (2000) (finding the respondent’s business of registering generic or
descriptive domain names for resale give respondent a legitimate interest in
craftworks.com); see also Capt’n Snooze Mgmt. v. Domains 4 Sale, WIPO Case No.
D2000-0488 (July 10, 2000); Mobile Communications v. Dittmar, WIPO Case No.
D2000-0524 (July 17, 2000).
236. See Brookfield Comm. v. W. Coast Entm’t Corp., 174 F.3d 1036, 1044 (9th
Cir. 1999) (“Because each web page must have an unique domain name, Network
Solutions checks to see whether the requested domain name has already been
assigned to someone else.  If so, the applicant must choose a different domain
name”).  For example, a Swiss artists’ collective registered the domain name
etoy.com and the online toy company registered the domain name etoys.com. See
Conley, supra note 232 (reporting etoys.com sued etoy.com after etoy.com refused
the half a million dollars offer and the parties settled the case).
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dealings in generic domain names are held by domain name dispute
resolution panels to be legitimate business interest.237  Moreover,
courts have held that the “.com” top level of domain names should
not be considered part of a trademark.238  Only the word or words
constituting the second level domain name, such as etoy, are
considered in a trademark inquiry.  In sum, many E-I-G domain
names will not survive the bar of being generic.239
B. Generic Domain Names Protection Under Unfair Competition Law?
Unfair competition is a broad and flexible doctrine of commercial
tort that intends to promote honesty and fair dealing.240 Courts define
unfair competition as “the umbrella for all statutory and nonstatutory
causes of action arising out of business conduct that is contrary to
honest practice in industrial or commercial matters.”241  While the law
of unfair competition has its roots in the common law of deceit,242
over the years the doctrine has been broadened to include other
conducts.  The illegal conduct includes, among others, passing off,243
                                                          
237. See infra note 239 and accompanying text.
238. See CCBN.com, Inc. v. C-CALL.com, Inc., 73 F. Supp. 2d 106, 112 (D. Mass.
1999) (finding that “.com” suffix has no trademark significance “because ‘.com’ is a
generic locator for domain names of web sites dedicated to commercial use”); see also
Hardrock Café Int’l v. Morton, No. 97 Civ.9483(RPP), 1999 WL 717995, at *23
(S.D.N.Y. Sept. 9, 1999) (finding that suffix “.com” has no trademark significance).
239. Of course if a domain name is descriptive and has been used as a trademark,
the domain name can receive trademark registration upon proof of secondary
meaning.  Likewise, if a domain name is arbitrary, fanciful, or suggestive and has
been used as a trademark the domain name will be protected under trademark law
and can receive registration without proof of secondary meaning.  Such registration,
if it becomes uncontestable, will not be subject to cancellation.  See, e.g., Park ‘N Fly,
Inc. v. Dollar Park & Fly, Inc., 469 U.S. 189, 205 (1985).
240. See generally MCCARTHY, supra note 15, at § 1:9, 1-18 to 1-19 (reviewing judicial
attempts to define unfair competition).
241. Am. Heritage Life Ins. Co. v. Heritage Life Ins. Co., 494 F.2d 3, 14 (5th Cir.
1974).  Unfair competition also has been defined as:
A term which may be applied generally to all dishonest or fraudulent rivalry
in trade and commerce, but is particularly applied to the practice of
endeavoring to substitute one’s own goods or products in the markets for
those of another, having an established reputation and extensive sale, by
means of imitating or counterfeiting the name.
Parameter Driven Software, Inc. v. Mass. Bay Ins., 25 F.3d 332, 336 (6th Cir. 1994).
242. See Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 157 (1989)
(noting the common law origins of unfair competition).
243. See Kellogg Co. v. Nat’l Biscuit Co., 305 U.S. 111, 122 (1938) (finding no
evidence of passing off under unfair competition law in a case where the defendant’s
use of the term “Shredded Wheat” and sharing the goodwill of the term are not
causing public confusion because the term had become generic and the defendant
had used reasonable precaution to prevent confusion as to origin); Qualitex Co., 13
F.3d at 1303 (passing off is “the selling of a good of one’s own creation under the
name or mark of another”); Am. Footwear Corp. v. Gen. Footwear Co., 609 F.2d 655,
662 (2d Cir. 1979) (stating that unfair competition liability can arise when a
defendant confuses “the public into mistakenly purchasing the product in the belief
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disparagement of reputation or tarnishing,244 misappropriation of the
skill, expenditures, or labor of another,245 and diversion of business
values.246
Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act247 allows a plaintiff to recover for
unfair competition if she can show that a term “is so associated with
its goods that use of the same or similar term by another company
constitutes a representation that its goods come from the same
source.”248  Unlike some states’ unfair competition laws, the Lanham
Act does not require the plaintiff to prove bad faith or an intent to
deceive.249  Furthermore, Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act neither
mentions nor incorporates the statutory definition of trademarks.250
This suggests that a claim of unfair competition is not foreclosed
simply because something is generic and not entitled to trademark
protection.251
                                                          
that the product is the product of the competitor.”).
244. See Hormel Foods Corp. v. Jim Henson Prods., Inc., 73 F.3d 497, 507 (2d Cir.
1996) (noting that the dilution of the quality of a trademark through unfair
competition can occur and tarnishes a trademark by associating it with things “shady”
or “unsavory”).
245. INS v. Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215, 241-42 (1918) (recognizing two new
causes of action differing from the “passing off” doctrine: cause of actions based
upon the misappropriation and exploitation of a competitor’s business efforts).
246. See infra note 250 for the text of the pertinent Section of the Lanham Act.
Professor McCarthy has an extensive list of examples of unfair competition.  See
MCCARTHY, supra note 15, at § 1:10, 1-22 to 1-23.
247. See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (1994 & Supp. 2000).
248. Genesee Brewing Co. v. Stroh Brewing Co., 124 F.3d 137, 149-50 (2d Cir.
1997) (quoting Forschner Group, Inc. v. Arrow Trading Co., 30 F.3d 348, 358-59 (2d
Cir. 1994)).
249. Jeffrey Milstein, Inc. v. Greger, Lawlor, Roth, Inc., 58 F.3d 27, 34-35 (2d Cir.
1995) (noting New York State common law unfair competition claim requires a
showing of bad faith); Johnson & Johnson v. Carter-Wallace, Inc., 631 F.2d 186, 189
(2d Cir. 1980) (the Lanham Act “does not require proof of intent to deceive” in
order to sustain a claim of unfair competition).
250. Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act states:
(1) Any person who, on or in connection with any goods or services, or any
container for goods, uses in commerce any word, term, name, symbol, or
device, or any combination thereof, or any false designation of origin, false
or misleading description of fact, or false or misleading representation of
fact, which—
(A) is likely to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive as to the
affiliation, connection, or association of such person with another person, or
as to the origin, sponsorship, or approval of his or her goods, services, or
commercial activities by another person, or
(B) in commercial advertising or promotion, misrepresents the nature,
characteristics, qualities, or geographic origin of his or her or another
person’s goods, services, or commercial activities,
shall be liable in a civil action by any person who believes that he or she is or
is likely to be damaged by such act.
15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (1994 & Supp. 2000).
251. See Murphy Door Bed Co. v. Interior Sleep Sys., 874 F.2d 95, 102 (2d Cir.
1989) (finding that the term “Murphy Bed” was generic, but that Interior Sleep
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A generic mark, though not entitled to trademark protection, used
by a defendant without exercising every reasonable means to prevent
confusion as to the source of the product may be protected under
federal unfair competition law.252  The Second Circuit in a line of
cases such as Murphy Door Bed Co. v. Interior Sleep Systems,253 Forschner
Group, Inc. v. Arrow Trading Co. Inc.,254 and Genesee Brewing Co., Inc. v.
Stroh Brewing Co.,255 have held that the fact that the plaintiff’s
trademark is generic as applied to products does not preclude a
finding that a defendant has violated the Lanham Act by engaging in
unfair competition. To establish an unfair competition claim, the
plaintiff must show that (1) “an association of origin by the consumer
between the mark and the first user, that is, secondary meaning;” and
(2) “a likelihood of consumer confusion when the mark is applied to
the second user’s good.”256  Since the mark is generic, the defendant
may escape liability because she has “the right to use generic product
names that have traditionally been associated with one
manufacturer,” as long as such use is conducted in a fair manner that
avoids consumer confusion as to the source of the product.257
Even if the plaintiff prevails in an unfair competition claim against
the defendant for using a generic name that causes a likelihood of
consumer confusion, relief is limited to certain means to alleviate the
source of confusion caused by the defendant.258  Courts may require
                                                          
Systems nonetheless violated unfair trade practices).
252. See Genesee Brewing, 124 F.3d at 149 (citing Kellogg Co. v. Nat’l Biscuit Co.,
305 U.S. 111, 121 (1938)) (establishing that reasonable precaution to prevent
confusion or deception in the sale of a product must be exercised in order to protect
consumers and avoid liability).
253. 874 F.2d 95, 102 (2d Cir. 1989) (explaining that while a mark may be generic
and not entitled in trademark protection, a claim of unfair competition is not
foreclosed).
254. 30 F.3d 348, 359 (2d Cir. 1994) (asserting that relief is also available when the
misrepresentation of source arises through the use of a phrase, such as Swiss Army
knife, which is generic ab initio).
255. 124 F.3d 137, 150 (2d Cir. 1997) (holding that a generic mark when applied
to a competitor’s product does not per se violate the unfair competition provisions of
the Lanham Act).
256. Id. at 150 (quoting Forschner Group, Inc. v. Arrow Trading Co. 904 F. Supp.
1409, 1417); Kellogg Co., 305 U.S. at 122 (“Sharing in the goodwill of an article
unprotected by patent or trademark is the exercise of a right possessed by all—and in
the free exercise of which the consuming public is deeply interested.  There is no
evidence of passing off or deception on the part of the Kellogg Company; and it has
taken every reasonable precaution to prevent confusion or the practice of deception
in the sale of its product.”).
257. Genesee Brewing, 124 F.3d at 150 (“[W]hile subsequent producers have the
right to use generic product names that have traditionally been associated with one
manufacturer, those users have an obligation ‘to use every reasonable means to
prevent confusion’ as to the source of the products.” (quoting Kellogg Co., 305 U.S. at
121)).
258. See id. (asserting that where a generic mark is involved the relief granted
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the defendant to “distinguish its product or to notify consumers
explicitly that its product does not come from the original
manufacturer.”259
Since the trademark is generic, courts “may not prevent the
defendant from using the plaintiff’s mark altogether.”260  Any
injunctive relief preventing the defendant from using the plaintiff’s
generic mark is inappropriate in a claim of unfair competition with
respect to a generic mark.261  Other courts, however, do not endorse
the Second Circuit’s expansion of unfair competition law to protect a
generic mark.262 To date, the Second Circuit is the only court that
allows federal unfair competition protection for generic mark
claims.263
Under the Second Circuit’s rationale, an unfair competition claim
for E-I-G domain names seems viable at a first glance.  Because of the
dual functions of domain names, the owner of a generic domain
name must first demonstrate that the domain name is not merely an
address, but functions as a trademark in relation to the goods,
services or content provided at the associated web site.264  Applying
the Second Circuit’s test, the generic domain name must have
acquired a secondary meaning.265  That requires the owner of the
generic domain name to prove with demonstrable evidence that
                                                          
should only go as far as to eliminate the source of confusion caused).
259. See id. at 151 (quoting Forschner Group v. Arrow Trading Co., Inc.,  30 F.3d 348,
359).
260. See id. (citing Kellogg Co., 305 U.S. at 121).  The Second Circuit in Genesee
Brewing found that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying the
plaintiff’s preliminary injunctive relief of preventing defendant from using the
generic trademark “Honey Brown” on beer, even if the plaintiff was likely to prevail
on its unfair competition claim.  See id. at 151.
261. See id. (finding that the requested injunction forbidding the defendant from
using the words “Honey Brown” on defendant’s product was too broad).
262. See Yellow Cab Co. of Charlottesville v. Rocha, No. Civ.A.3:00-CV00013, 2000
WL 1130621 at *7 (W.D. Va. July 5, 2000) (asserting that the Fourth Circuit, unlike
the Second Circuit, considers a finding that a trade name is generic as dispositive in
determining whether any allegations of unfair trade can be sustained).
263. See generally Home Builders Assoc. of Greater St. Louis v. L & L Exhibition
MgMt., 226 F.3d 945, 950 (8th Cir. 2000) (noting that the Genesse Brewing decision
extended unfair competition under the Lanham Act to generic marks); WSM, Inc. v.
Hilton, 724 F.2d 1320, 1331 n.5 (8th Cir. 1984) (“Even a generic mark may be
entitled to protection from unfair competition if the mark is so associated with its
goods that the use of the same or similar marks by another company constitutes a
representation that its goods came from the same source.”) (citation omitted).
264. See Lockheed Martin Corp. v. Network Solutions, Inc., 985 F. Supp. 949, 956
(C.D. Cal. 1997), aff’d, 194 F.3d 980 (9th Cir. 1999) (noting the dual functions of
domain names).
265. See BigStar Entm’t, Inc. v. Next Big Star, Inc., 105 F. Supp. 2d 185, 186
(S.D.N.Y. 2000) (explaining that establishing secondary meaning provides the
benefit of attaching the trademark, thereby giving it protection under the Lanham
Act, if consumers associate the term with a particular source).
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there is “an association of origin by the consumer” between the
generic domain name and the plaintiff.266  Since most domain names
have been used for a relatively short period, as e-commerce is still in
its nascent stages, owners of generic domain names would have
difficulty establishing secondary meaning for generic domain
names.267  In addition, the plaintiff must demonstrate the likelihood
of confusion by the defendant using the domain name to mislead
Internet consumers that they are getting the plaintiff’s products.268
Extending unfair competition law to protect generic domain
names raises some major concerns.  The party who obtains the
generic domain name merely by registering the name first, gains an
unfair advantage over its competitors.269  This means the first domain
name registrant can exclude all competitors from using generic terms
and thwart the fundamental policy of being generic.270 Although
Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act protects consumers from likelihood
of confusion, expanding that section to include competitor’s use of
generic terms fails to reconcile with other provisions in the Lanham
Act that grant no protection to generic trademarks.271  Most courts do
                                                          
266. Genesee Brewing Co., Inc. v. Stroh Brewing Co., 124 F.3d 137, 143 n.4 (2d
Cir. 1997) (describing that to qualify for trademark protection, an owner of a
descriptive mark must demonstrate that the mark had acquired secondary meaning
before its competitor commenced use of the mark).
267. See Big Star Entm’t, 105 F. Supp. at  203 (holding that a two year time period of
a descriptive domain name was not enough to acquire secondary meaning for
purposes of trademark protection under the Lanham Act).
268. See Am. Footwear Corp. v. Gen. Footwear Co., 609 F.2d 655, 662 (2d Cir.
1979) (asserting that unfair competition liability only arises when the defendant sells
its product in a way that would make the public believe that it was a competitor’s
product), cited in Genesee Brewing Co., 124 F.3d at 150.
269. An extension of unfair competition law to protect generic domain names is
especially worrisome with the approval of seven new Web suffixes by the Internet
Corporation for Assignment Names and Numbers.  See New Web Suffixes are Changing
the Rules, CNET.Com (Dec. 11, 2000) at http://news.cnet.com/news/0-1005-201-
4065509-0.html.
270. See MCCARTHY, supra note 15, at §§ 12:2 to 12:8.1 (explaining that public
policy dictates that a generic term is free for all to use because granting exclusive
rights to use of a generic term would be equivalent to creating a monopoly in that
particular product).
271. See 15 U.S.C. § 1052(e)(1) (1994 & Supp. 2000) (“No trade-mark by which
the goods of the applicant may be distinguished from the goods of others shall be
refused registration of the principle register on account of its nature unless it—
Consists of a mark which when used on or in connection with the goods of the
applicant is merely descriptive or deceptively misdescriptive of them . . .”); see also id.
§ 1052(f) (“Except as expressly excluded in paragraphs (a), (b), (c), (d), and (e)(3)
of this section, nothing in this chapter shall prevent the registration of a mark used
by the applicant which has become distinctive of the applicant’s goods in
commerce.”); id. at § 1064(3) (explaining that a petition to cancel a registration of a
mark may be filed at any time the registered mark becomes a generic mark); id.
§ 1127 (holding that a mark is deemed abandoned either when the mark becomes
the generic name on or in connection with which it is used or losses its significance
as a mark).
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not protect generic terms in trademark infringement and unfair
competition cases.272 A finding of genericness should be dispositive of
whether any allegations of unfair competition can be sustained.273
Extending unfair competition law with respect to generic domain
names will hinder the growth of e-commerce.274 For example, a jury in
the Northern District of California awarded E-cards.com a $4 million
verdict that includes $1 million in punitive damages in an unfair
competition action against Ecards.com.275  E-cards.com is a California
company which provides electronic greetings at its web site and
Ecards.com is a Canadian company that also sells electronic greeting
cards over the Internet.”276  E-cards.com or ecards.com are generic
domain names and both are being used naming the products or
services of electronic cards over the Internet.
The first registrant of the generic domain name now has the
monopoly in the generic term itself.  Competitors who want to enter
the electronic cards business are now forbidden to use the necessary
terms, e-cards or ecards to name or describe their electronic cards
business for fear of being brought to courts to defend their necessary
use of the generic terms.277
Accordingly, to ensure normal and fair competition, courts should
not extend unfair competition protection under the Lanham Act to
                                                          
272. See Yellow Cab Co. of Charlottesville, No. Civ.A.3:00-CV00013, 2000 WL 1130621
at *7 (W.D. Va. July 5, 2000) (explaining that only one circuit court has cited Genesee
Brewing since the Second Circuit’s 1997 holding).
273. See id. at *8 (“This indicates that, unlike the Second Circuit, the Fourth
Circuit considered a finding that a trade name was generic to be dispositive in
determining whether any allegations of unfair trade can be sustained.”); Ale House
Mgmt. v. Raleigh Ale House, Inc., 205 F.3d 137, 151 (4th Cir. 2000) (rejecting the
Genesee Brewing position and affirming the district court’s finding that the “ale house”
mark is generic and the generic finding is dispositive in determining whether any
unfair competition allegations could be sustained).
274. One area of concern is that unusual use of unfair competition law to address
a domain-name dispute may create a wave of litigation.  See John Partridge, Canadian
Internet firm loses suit in U.S., THE GLOBE & MAIL (May 12, 1999) (explaining that the
use of competition law could lead to a sting of cases), available at
http://www.globaltechnology.com/archive/gam/News/20000512/RECAR.html.
275. See Steve Bonisteel, E-cards Flap Has Many Unhappy Returns For Canadians,
MICROTIMES.COM (May 12, 2000), available at http://www.microtimes.com/
newsfeeds/may%2000/May12.html. (“Toronto’s Ecards.com, which specializes in
wacky, Macromedia Flash-animated greeting cards, was sued by California-based E-
cards (at E-cards.com), not under new “cybersquatting” rules, but on the grounds
that the similarity of the Canadian company’s name confused consumers and thus
was unfair competition.”).
276. See id.
277. Some Internet law experts fear that such a scheme sets a dangerous
precedent.  As Michael Geist, a predominate Internet law professor at the University
of Ottawa Law School in Canada explained, “[t]here is certainly concern about
whether or not simply adding an ‘e’- or ‘e’ and a hyphen – is sufficient to overcome
the very generic nature of e-cards.  It seems that we now live in a world of ‘e-
everything,’ so an ‘e’ in front of a word is pretty generic at this stage in time.”  See id.
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generic domain names.278  In the event that a court decided in favor
of the plaintiff in an unfair competition claim involving a generic
domain name, the court should follow the Second Circuit’s ruling on
the relief issue.279 Courts should not prohibit defendants from using
the generic domain names.280  Injunctive relief against use of generic
domain names is inappropriate in a claim of unfair competition
involving generic domain names.281  As dictated by the Second Circuit
decision in Genesee Brewing, courts should only require a defendant to
display a disclaimer at its web site that its generic domain name and
web site are not affiliated with the plaintiff.282
CONCLUSION
The current craving for generic domain name investment and the
new approach to short-term branding on the Internet which use
generic words or words with “e” or “i” prefixes are creating a domain
name scarcity problem in the primary domain name market.  This
problem will escalate if trademark and unfair competition are
extended to cover generic domain names.  Protection for generic
domain names has no support in trademark jurisprudence.  Indeed,
it would be contrary to the basic principles of trademark law and fair
competition to grant exclusive use in generic domain names.  Sixty-
three years ago the Supreme Court announced that even if a generic
name has attained goodwill, competitors have the right to trade on
the goodwill since there is no legal protection for a generic term.283
Generic domain names should be treated accordingly today.  It is
important that at this early stage of e-commerce development, fair
competition, not inequitable competition through exclusive use of
generic domain names, should be the guiding principle.
                                                          
278. The use of unfair competition claims will allow plaintiffs to commence
litigation from a new approach outside of “cybersquatting” complaints.  See id.
279. See Genesee Brewing Co. v. Stroh Brewing Co., 124 F.3d 137, 151 (2d Cir.
1997) (holding that while a court may require a newcomer to distinguish its product,
it may not prevent the defendant from using the plaintiff’s mark altogether).
280. See id.
281. See id. (finding that an injunction is inappropriate in a claim of unfair
competition with respect to a generic mark).
282. See id. (holding that a court may require a newcomer to notify consumers
explicitly that its product does not come from the original manufacturer).
283. See Kellogg Co. v. Nat’l Biscuit Co., 305 U.S. 111, 122 (1938) (“Kellogg
Company is undoubtedly sharing in the goodwill of the article known as ‘Shredded
Wheat;’ and thus is sharing in a market which was created by the skill and judgment
of plaintiff’s predecessor and has been widely extended by vast expenditures in
advertising persistently made.  But that is not unfair.  Sharing in the goodwill of an
article unprotected by patent or trade-mark is the exercise of a right possessed by
all—and in the free exercise of which the consuming public is deeply interested.”).
